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AND THE 1976 CIVIL RIGHTS 

ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT 

Arthur D Wolf* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At least smce the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure m 1938, the trend m tnal practice has been to encourage the 
JOImng of clrums and partIeS m a smgle actIon so that related ques­
tions of law and fact may be adjudicated at the same tIme.! "Un­
der the [Federal] Rules, the Impulse IS toward entertrunmg the 
broadest possible scope of actIon consIstent with frurness to the 
partIes; Jomder of clrums, partIes and remedies IS strongly encour 
aged."2 Such liberal Jomder rules promote the values of conve­
mence and frurness to the partIes as well as that of JudicIal 
economy Persons who have legal disputes among themselves no 
longer need to engage m multIple actIons to resolve related 
controverSIes. 
ThIS altogether salutary trend m modem cIvil practIce, whIch 
has elimmated a number of difficultIes under older rules of prac­
tIce, has m tum created a number of newer problems. One of 
those problems relates to the questIon of attorney fees, the subject 
of thIS artIcle. Suppose, for exrunple, the plamtiff asserts two dis­
tmct but related clrums agrunst a defendant. Assume further that 
the legIslature has authonzed the award of attorney fees to the pre­
vailing party with respect to only one of those two clrums. Now 
suppose the plruntiff wms the lawsuit but recovery IS based on the 
clrum whICh does not have an attorney fee provIsIon. Is the plruntiff 
nonetheless entitled to counsel fees because they may be awarded 
ASSOCiate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, 
A.B., Tufts Umversity 1962; LL.B., ColumbIa Law School, 1965. From 1973-78, Pro­
fessor Wolf served as specIal counsel to Representative Robert F Drman of the 
Fourth CongressIOnal Distnct of Massachusetts. 
1. See generally 6-7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO­
CEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1581-82, at 787-95, §§ 1651-52, at 260-68 (1971-72). 
2. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (footnote omitted). 
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under the other chum? The problem IS particularly acute when one 
of the two clrums rests on the assertlOn of a constitutional nght. On 
many occaSlOns, the United States Supreme Court and the high­
est state courts have admomshed lower courts to decide non­
constitutional clrums before they resolve constitutional ones, 3 so 
that deCISions of far reachmg and Important constitutional Issues 
are not made unnecessarily 
With enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards 
Act of 1976,4 these difficulties m awarding counsel fees m multl­
clrum litigation mtensified. The 1976 Act authonzes state and fed­
eral courts to award counsel fees to the prevailing party m cases 
based on eight types of drums specified m the statute. The stat­
utes covered by the 1976 Fees Act are the baSIC post-Civil War 
Civil nghts acts, 5 two recent anbdiscnmmatIon provlslons, 6 and 
certam actlOns under the Internal Revenue Code. 7 A great deal of 
current Civil nghts and Civil liberties litigation IS mitIated under 
one or more of these statutory proVlslons. Under present practice, 
it IS also very common for plruntiffs to allege m their complamts ad­
ditional drums based on federal or state law In some mstances, the 
plruntiff may even seek to Jom additional defendants based on 
clrums not withm the ongmal JunsdictIon of the federal court. 8 
These "pendent drum or pendent party cases create additional 
difficulties m the application of the 1976 Fees Act. 9 
3. E.g., Hagans Lavme, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Burton United States, 196 
U.S. 283 (1905); Donadio Cunmngham, 58 N.J. 309,277 A.2d 375 (1971); Binder 
Tnangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 53 (1971). Despite the settled rule, 
lower courts continue to deCide constitutIonal questions when apparently dispOSI­
tive non-constitutional grounds are available. See Ludtke Kuhn, 461 F Supp. 86 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Webster Redmond, 443 F Supp. 670 (N.D. Ill. 1977). 
4. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). See generally Derfner, One Giant 
Step: The Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 441 
(1977). 
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985, & 1986 (1976). In the public law whICh enacted 
the Fees Act, these prOVISIOns are referred to as they appeared m the REVISED 
STATUTES, respectively, sections 1977 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981, because title 42 
has never been codified. H.R. REP No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.5 (1976). 
See also Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). 
6. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1976); Ti­
tle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976). 
7 The Fees Act covers only tax enforcement actions brought by the United 
States under the Code. See generally M. Derfner, The Civil Rights Attorney Fees 
Awards Act of 1976, at 17-18 (1979) (to be published by the Practicmg Law Institute 
February 1980). 
8. E.g., Aldinger Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Moor County of Alameda, 411 
U.S. 693 (1973). 
9. For diSCUSSIOns of the relatIOnship between pendent claim and pendent par­
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ThIS artIcle will focus on the applicatlon of the Fees Act m the 
context of multI-clrum litigatIon where the Judgment rests on a 
clrum not enumerated m the Act (the non-fee clrum") , even 
though a vIOlabon of one of the covered statutes (the "fee clrum") IS 
alleged m the complrunt. The subject IS diVIded mto two types of 
multI-clrum cases: (1) Where the plruntiff's clrums mvolve both 
constitutional and non-constitubonal Issues; and (2) where the 
plruntiff's claIms mvolve only non-constitubonal consIderations. The 
article will also discuss the constitutIOnal questions whIch the appli­
catIon of the Fees Act raIses from both a federal and state court 
perspective. Finally some attention will be prud to the potenbal 
scope of the Fees Act m multI-clrum litIgatIon. 
II. COVERAGE OF THE 1976 FEES AWARDS ACT 
On October 19, 1976, PresIdent Ford, a few hours before the 
bill would have died by pocket veto, sIgned mto law the Civil 
Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976. 10 Although the bill did 
not generate a great deal of outsIde controversy as it moved 
through the NatIonal Legtslature m the final days of the 94th Con­
gress, it did create some turmoil mSIde the Congress. The bill 
passed the Senate only after a detenmned effort by the leadershIp 
and the chIef senatonal sponsors to break a filibuster by equally 
detennmed opponents of the measure. ll After passmg the Senate 
ty Junsdiction, see Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent junsdiction, 77 
COLUM. L. REV 127 (1977); Comment, The Impact of Aldinger v. Howard on Pen­
dent Party junsdiction, 125 U. PA. L. REV 1357 (1978); Note, The Concept of Law­
Tied Pendent junsdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger ReconsIdered, 87 YALE L.J. 627 
(1978); Note, Federal Pendent Party junsdiction and United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs-Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REV 194 (1976); Note, 
Pendent Party junsdiction: The DemIse of Doctnne? 27 DRAKE L. REv 361 
(1977-78). 
10. Under the Constitution, the PresIdent has 10 days to veto bill, unless 
Congress has, m the mtenm, adjourned, m whICh case the bill automatically dies 
(the pocket veto). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 2. Although Congress adjourned on Oc­
tober 1, 1976, the bill, S. 2278, was not presented to PresIdent Ford for hIS sIgnature 
until October 9, and thus the 10 days did not start runmng until then. M. Derfner, 
supra note 7, at 12-13. 
11. Because of the filibuster, the Senate debated the measure from September 
21 to September 29, 1976, the day the bill finally passed by a vote of 57-15. Derfner, 
supra note 7, at 10-11. Ordinarily such late m the seSSIOn filibusters would be suc­
cessful because of the need to complete the pending busmess, whICh usually piles 
up m the weeks Immediately preceding an adjournment. In thIS case, Senate aIdes 
reported, ASSIstant Majority Leader Robert Byrd and the chIef sponsors of the mea­
sure refused to withdraw the bill because of the Impending retirement of Senator 
Philip Hart and of Senator Hugh Scott, both long time CIvil nghts proponents. In­
deed Senator Hart could no longer come to the Senate floor because of illness. Pur­
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two days before the end of the seSSIOn, it reached the House floor 
for final actIon only because the House leadershIp and sponsors 
were equally detenmned to move the bill. 12 The measure passed 
the House on October 1, 1976, the last day of the 94th Congress. 13 
The 1976 Fees Act authonzes the state and federal courts to 
award counsel fees to the prevailing party m litIgatIon under cer 
tam specified sectIons of the United States Code. 14 The Act covers 
suits brought pursuant to sectIons 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 
1986.15 SectIon 1981 prohibits, among other thmgs, discnmmatIon 
on the baSIS of race or color m the makmg and enforcmg of con­
tracts. 16 It IS used regularly to challenge raCIal discnmmatIon m 
employment, although it IS not limited to the employment relatIon­
shIp.17 SectIOn 1982 forbIds raCIal discnmmatIon m the sale or 
rental of property and IS employed to challenge housmg discnmI­
suant to the wlshes of Senators Hart and Scott and as parting memonal to then 
dedicated servlCe, the Senate leadershlp perslsted m getting the bill passed. 
12. The efforts to pass the bill ill the House were equally dramatic as its JOur­
ney through the Senate. On September 9, 1976, the House Judiclary Committee fa­
vorably reported H.R. 15460, the House counterpart to S. 2278 (the bill whlCh 
eventually became Public Law number 94-559). Id. at 9. Because the House Rules 
Committee was no longer processmg any bills, except emergency measures, at that 
pomt ill September, the House leaders declded to place the bill on the SuspenslOn 
Calendar, procedure whlCh permits the expeditious conslderation of non­
controverslal" measures. Id. at 12. When bill on the Suspenslon Calendar lS con­
sldered on the floor of the House, no amendments are permitted and passage lS 
achleved only by two-thlrds vote. Because many measures were ahead of the attor­
neys fees bill on the suspenSlOn calendar, the House never reached it on those few 
days m September, 1976, when the House rules permitted votes on suspenSlOns. 
When the Senate passed the bill on September 29, 1976 the House leaders realistic­
ally had only one option: ask the Rules Committee to meet specially and to give the 
bill rule so it could be brought to the floor for action. After flurry of telephone 
calls and with the necessary help from Speaker O'Neill, the Committee agreed to 
meet m the early evenmg of September 30th (the Republican members of the Rules 
Committee refused to attend, m part, because they did not like the timmg m 
bnngmg the measure to the floor). With barely quorum present, the Committee ap­
proved resolution (the rule") permitting the House to consider the Senate bill. Id. 
13. After bill passes both houses, it must be enrolled" and otherwise pre­
pared for the signature of the PreSident. In part because of backlog whICh occurs at 
the end of seSSlOns of Congress, bills may not be sent to the White House for several 
days after passage. In thiS case, nme days elapsed before S. 2278 went to Presldent 
Ford. See note 10, supra. 
14. Durmg the House debate, Representative Robert F Drman, the floor mana­
ger for the bill, stated that it would be equally applicable m state courts as well as ill 
federal courts. 122 CONGo REC. 35122 (1976). E.g., Young TOla, 66 App. Div 2d 
377 413 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. 1979). 
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985, 1986 (1976). 
16. E.g., Johnson Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
17 E.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973) 
(admlsslOn to recreational facilities covered by the statute). 
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natIon. 18 Section 1983 IS by far the most wIdely used federal stat­
ute when attackmg allegedly unconstitutional or otherwIse illegal 
actIOn taken "under color of state law It IS used m a broad vanety 
of CIvil nghts and CIvil libertIes cases,19 and IS not limited to litiga­
tion mvolvmg raCIal, ethmc, or gender-based discnmmatIon. 2o Sec­
tions 1985 and 1986 provIde a CIvil remedy for challengmg consplr 
aCIeS, both public and pnvate, to depnve persons of the equal 
protection of the laws. 21 The scope of these provisons IS presently 
m a state of flux. 22 
The Act extends also to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
196423 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.24 Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 IS a general prohibition against 
discrImmatIon on the baSIS of race, color, or national ongm" m 
any program or activity whIch receIves federal finanCIal aSSIS­
tance. 25 It reaches all reCIpIents of federal funds, whether or not 
they are acting under color of law 26 Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, whIch was modeled after title VI, forbIds 
certain federally aSSIsted educational mstitutIons from discnmmat­
mg on the baSIS of sex, blindness, or severe VISUal ImpaInnent. 27 
Finally certam lawsuits under the Internal Revenue Code are also 
brought withm the pUrvIew of the statute by the Allen Amend­
ment. 28 
18. E.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
19. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights Metropolitan Hous. Dev Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977) (houslllg discnmmation); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. 
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (dismissal of school teacher for exerclSlng first amend­
ment nghts of free speech); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school 
segregation). 
20. E.g., Hutto Finney 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Young Amertcan Mim The­
atres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (attack on local obscenity ordinance as overbroad and 
vague). 
21. E.g., Griffin Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
22. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Say & Loan Ass v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345 
(1979). 
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1976). 
24. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); see, e.g., Regents of the Umv of Cal. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978); Hills Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); e.g., Laufman Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F 
Supp. 489 (S.D. OhIO 1976). 
27 See, e.g., Cannon v. Umversity of ChICago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
28. Senator James Allen led the filibuster III the Senate agamst the Fees Act. In 
part to termmate the extended debate over the bill, the chief sponsors agreed to 
support hiS amendment whICh authOrized the award of attorney fees to the prevailing 
party m tax enforcement cases brought by the United States. Derfner, supra note 7 
at 11. 
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III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEES ACT AS ApPLIED 
IN MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION 
The constitutionality of the 1976 Fees Act, as applied to multI­
claIm litigatIon discussed m thIS artIcle, has not presented grave 
problems for the courts. 29 Since a great majority of the cases 
ansmg under the 1976 Act have mvolved state or local governmen­
tal defendants, the decIded cases have focused on the validity of 
the Act m that context. Two prmcipal grounds have been advanced 
to challenge the constitutionality of the Act: (1) The Act contra­
venes the eleventh amendment to the ConstitutIOn by mtruding on 
state sovereIgn Immunity and (2) the statute exceeds the delegated 
powers of Congress m permittmg fees to be awarded to a plamtiff 
who prevails only on a state claIm. Each of these contentions will 
be exammed m turn. 
A. The Eleventh Amendment Contention 
State defendants have sought to challenge the statute on the 
baSIS of the eleventh amendment, whIch protects the sovereIgn Im­
munity of the states agaInst mtrusIOns by pnvate damage suits m 
the federal courts. 30 The United States Supreme Court rejected 
that attack on the Fees Act m Hutto v. Finney 31 In that suit, the 
plaIntiffs, who had prevailed m litigation to correct unconstitutIonal 
conditions m the Arkansas pnsons, moved for an award of attorney 
fees agaInst the state offiCIals for legal expenses at the tnal and ap­
pellate levels. The Court held that the eleventh amendment does 
not bar an award of counsel fees. It affirmed the award for the 
work performed m the tnal court based on the finding that the de­
fendants had litigated III bad faith. For the legal serVICes proVIded 
at the appellate level, the Court approved the award based on the 
1976 Fees Act. 32 
First, the Court stated that eleventh amendment sovereIgn 
Immunity does not extend to the payment of litigation costs by 
unsuccessful state offiCIals. For years, the Court had permitted the 
29. E.g., Seals Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977); Gagne 
v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cen. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979). 
30. See Edelman Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Court has sought to draw 
line between Impermissible retroactive monetary relief, as In Edelman, and per­
missible prospective relief even though it has direct and substantial Impact on the 
state treasury Milliken Bradley 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977); accord, Quem Jor­
dan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 
31. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
32. Id. at 689. 
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assessment of costs agaInst such officIals notwithstanding the shield 
of the eleventh amendment. 33 Since attorney fees are part of the 
costs of the lawsuit,34 the eleventh amendment Imposes no bar to 
their award. Second, the Court held that the Congress, under sec­
tion 5 of the fourteenth amendment, has the power to override the 
Immunity conferred by the eleventh amendment. 35 The only ques­
tion regarding any partIcular statute IS whether Congress Intended 
to do so. In Hutto the Court found sufficient expressIOn of con­
gressIOnal Intent In the legislative history of the 1976 Fees Act. 
HaVIng determIned that Congress Intended to lift the bar of elev­
enth amendment Immunity the Court upheld the award of counsel 
fees to the plaIntiffs against state offiCials to be paid from the state 
treasury 
The deCISIon In Hutto did not address the eleventh amend­
ment Issue In the context of pendent claim cases. In Hutto the 
plaintiff asserted only constitutIOnal claIms. The lower federal 
courts, however, both before and after Hutto have rejected sover 
elgn Immunity defenses seekIng to aVOid fee awards agamst state 
officlals. 36 These deCISIons have rejected the eleventh amendment 
defense whether the plaintiff prevailed on a federal statutory or 
state law ground. 37 The courts have not Imposed a more stnngent 
test of congressIOnal Intent to abrogate sovereign Immunity In 
awarding fees on prevailing pendent claims, state or federal, than 
on prevailing constitutional claIms. 38 Any doubt on the abrogation 
33. Fairmont Creamery Co. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70 (1927). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 
35. It relied upon an earlier case, Fitzpatnck Bitzer, 427 U.S. 455 (1976), for 
the proposition that Congress, under section five, may abrogate state sovereign Im­
munity In Bitzer male plaintiffs sued to enJOin state offiCials from discnmInating on 
the baSIS of sex In the operation of retirement benefits plan. After they prevailed, 
the plaintiffs sought to recover their attorney fees under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1976). The Court held that congressIOnal 
power under section five may override eleventh amendment sovereign Immunity. 
Lower courts disagree whether congressIOnal exercise of other delegated powers, 
such as under the copynght and patent clause, IS adequate to abrogate eleventh 
amendment Immunity. Compare Mills MUSIC, Inc. Anzona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (Congress has the authority to overnde) with Wihtol Crow, 309 F.2d 
777 (8th Cir. 1962) (Congress does not have the power to overnde). 
36. E.g., Seals Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977); Gagne 
v. 	Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979). 
37 E.g., Seals Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977); Gagne 
v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979). 
38. E.g., Anderson Redman, 474 F Supp. 511 (D. Del. 1979) (action by state 
pnsoners at Delaware Correctional Center to alleViate overcrowded conditions alleg­
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questIon should be resolved In favor of awarding fees to prevailing 
plaIntiffs because the legIslatIon should be liberally construed. 39 
B. The Delegated Powers Argument 
The other possible line of constitutIOnal challenge would anse 
most starkly In those suits In whIch the case IS disposed of on a 
state law ground to whIch the Fees Act does not expressly apply 
In these cases, fees are awarded because of the presence of an 
unresolved federal constitutIOnal Issue whICh has been pretermitted 
In favor of deCIding the case on the non-fee claim. The argument 
would be that Congress does not have the power to authonze the 
award of fees when a plaIntiff, assertIng both constitutIonal and 
state law claIms, prevails only on the latter. The Issue may be di­
vIded Into two parts: (1) When the multI-clrum actIOn IS brought In 
federal court, and (2) when the actIOn IS brought In state court. 
1. Federal Court Suits 
Any diSCUSSIOn of the constitutIOnality of awarding fees to suc­
cessful plaIntiffs who prevail on non-fee state law claims must begIn 
with the baSIS of federal court JunsdictIOn over such suits. In 
United Mme Workers v. Gibbs 40 the Supreme Court reformulated 
the test for eXerCISIng pendent JunsdictlOn over non-federal" 
clrums upon the proposition that all of a plamtiff's related claIms 
constitute one constitutional case " withm the meamng of article 
111.41 In Gibbs, the Supreme Court held that to exerCIse Junsdic­
tIOn over pendent, non-federal claims, a federal court must find: (1) 
The federal claim asserted IS suffiCient to confer subject matter JU­
nsdictIon, and (2) both federal and non-federal claims denve from 
a common nucleus of operatIve fact. "42 
edly m VIOlation of constitutIOnal and state law proSCrIptions); see Seals v. Quarterly 
County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th CiT. 1977); Gagne Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d CiT.), 
cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979); cf Corpus V. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175 (5th CiT. 1979) 
(rejected the defendants argument that strIct test of constitutionality should be ap­
plied In determInmg the scope of congressIOnal power under section five of the four­
teenth amendment to authorIze fees for legal services rendered prIor to the effective 
date of the act). 
39. As the Court noted In Hutto "[tlhe act could not be broader. 437 V .5. at 
694. See note 166 tnfra. 
40. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
41. See text accompanymg notes 59-77 mfra. Commentators who believe Gibbs 
IS unconstitutionally over-expansive may also find the Fees Act beyond congres­
SIOnal power. Note, The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent JUrisdiction: Gibbs and 
Aldinger ReconSIdered, 87 YALE L.J. 627 (1978). 
42. 383 V.S. at 725. 
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The premIse of Gibbs IS that, if the litIgatIon presents only 
one constitutIOnal case under artICle III, Congress may gIVe the 
federal courts the power "to decIde all the questIons m the case 
and to dispose of it on local or state questIons only "43 If Congress 
has the power under article III and the necessary and proper 
clause to gIVe such JunsdictIon to the federal courts, then it may 
also provIde whatever remedies are necessary to encourage or facil­
itate the mvocatIon of that JunsdictIon by plamtiffs. To effectuate 
the JunsdictIOnal grant, Congress may adopt appropnate means to 
facilitate the exerCIse of that JunsdictIon. 44 When state law claIms 
are properly Jomed to federal constitutIonal Issues, it IS appropnate 
for Congress to Implement the sensitIve JudicIally-created doctnne 
that non-constitutIOnal claIms should be deCIded first to aVOid un­
necessary constitutIonal declslonmakmg. To advance both of those 
permIssible goals, Congress may enact an attorney fee statute 
whIch authonzes fees to a plaIntiff who prevails on the non-fee, 
state claIm. 
In additIon, the constitutIOnal claIm, whICh provIdes the baSIS 
for federal court JunsdictIon, IS rooted m the fourteenth amend­
ment and asserted through the remedial prOVlSlon of sectIon 
1983. 45 Under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, Congress 
may enact appropnate legislatIon, such as sectIon 1983, to enforce 
the guarantees of that amendment. 46 ProvIding attorney fees when 
plaIntiffs prevail on those constitutIonal claIms IS withm the grant 
of power under sectIOn 5. The questIon here IS whether that grant 
extends to the non-fee, state claIm when Congress, recogmzmg the 
pendent JunsdictIOn doctrme and the policy of aVOiding unneces­
sary constitutIOnal decIsIons, authonzes the applicatIOn of the Fees 
Act to the plaIntiff who prevails on the state claIm. 
In definmg the scope of congreSSIOnal power under sectIon 5, 
the Supreme Court has adopted the clasSIC formulatIon artIculated 
m M'Culloch v. Maryland47 to determme the reach of other dele­
gated powers: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be withm the 
scope of the constitution, and all means whICh are appropnate, 
whICh are plamly adapted to that end, whIch are not prohibited, 
but conSIst with the letter and SpIrit of the constitutIOn, are con­
43. Siler v. LOUIsville & N.H.H., 213 U.S. 174,191 (1909). 
44. See Tennessee v. DaVIS, 100 U.S. 257 (1880). 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 
46. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Fitzpatnck Bitzer, 427 
U.S. 445 (1976). 
47 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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stitutIonal. "48 The attorney fee provlSlon satIsfies the applicable 
standards for legtslatmg under sectIon 5 so long as the non-fee, 
state chum properly relates to the federal constitutIOnal clrum. That 
relatIonshIp IS satIsfied through the applicatIOn of the Gibbs two­
pronged test of substantIality and common nucleus of operatIve 
fact. 49 
2. State Court Suits 
The constitutIOnal Issue m state court litIgatIOn IS sImilar to 
the claIm regarding federal courts with the added wrmkle that the 
pendent JunsdictIon argument, fully applicable m the federal 
courts, must be recast to fit the state court model. The adjust­
ments, although distmctIve, are not really maJor. Although Con­
gress has authonzed the state courts to hear federal constitutIonal 
clrums, it recogmzes that aVOIding a deCISIon on those clrums IS de­
SIrable if a non-constitutIonal ground IS dispositIve. To accomplish 
the dual goals of encouragmg the advancement of constitutIonal 
nghts and aVOIding unnecessary decISIons mterpretmg the ConstI­
tutIOn, Congress may encourage state court plruntiffs to Jom poten­
tIally dispositIve state clrums to theIr constitutIonal clrums. ProVld­
mg attorney fees to the prevailing plruntiff IS one reasonable means 
of accomplishmg those twm goals. 
It should also be borne m mmd that under Testa v. Katt,50 the 
state courts have a constitutIonal duty to adjudicate federal clrums 
at least when they entertam SImilar state clrums. To aSSIst the state 
courts m meetmg that duty Congress has the power to authonze 
counsel fees even on the state clrum. In Thiboutot v. State 51 the 
Mame Supreme JudicIal Court held that, although Congress did 
48. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (quoting M'Culloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
49. Gagne Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 
(1979); accord, Seals v. Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977). See 
generally note 126 mfra. In Corpus Estelle, 605 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979) the court 
of appeals rejected the contention that, III determmmg the constitutionality of stat­
ute Imposmg fees on state offiCials, the court should apply stnct standard for 
evaluating whether gIVen means IS plamly adopted to constitutIOnal end. Id. at 
177. Indeed the court suggested that the defendant must show unconstitutionality 
"beyond reasonable doubt" m attackmg statute passed under section five of the 
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 180. 
50. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). But see Chamberlam Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 442 
S.W.2d (1969) (Tennessee state courts are not obliged to entertalll actIOns based on 
§§ 1983 and 1985 (3)). 
51. 405 A.2d 230, 239 (Me. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W 3460 (Jan. 22, 
1980) (No. 79-838). 
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not reqmre the state courts to apply the 1976 Fees Act, Mame 
state courts should apply it as a matter of sound policy because of 
the deslrability of uniform remedies throughout the nation m clvil 
nghts actions. In Thiboutot, the tnal Judge entered Judgment for 
the plamtiffs without specifymg whether it rested on state or fed­
eral grounds. The Mame Supreme Judiclal Court stated that Con­
gress had sufficlent power under section 5 of the fourteenth 
amendment to authonze the award of such fees if a sectlOn 1983 
clrum lS available as a basls for the Judgment. 
Furthermore, the plenary power of Congress to adjust the JU­
nsdictIon of state and federal courts with regard to cases and con­
troverSles withm article III has been recogmzed from the begm­
nmg and has never been senously quesboned. 52 The exerClse by 
state courts of the authority to award fees m thls context may be 
Viewed as one of the conditions Congress has placed on thelr 
power to adjudicate federal constitutlOnal clrums. 53 
IV NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
It frequently occurs that plruntiffs will seek to Jom all of thelr 
clalms agrunst the defendant m one action, m either federal or state 
court. For example, m Lau v. Nichols,54 the plamtiffs, represenbng 
a class of Chmese school children, sued San Franclsco public 
school officlals m federal court to compel them to provlde adequate 
bilingual education. The plruntiffs asserted several clrums agrunst 
the defendants based on the fifth, mnth, and fourteenth amend­
ments to the United States ConstitutlOn, provlSlons of the state 
constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 
Education Code of Califorma. Similarly m Southern Burlington 
County NAACP v. Townshtp of Mount Laurel,55 the plruntiffs sued 
m state court to enJom the defendant's zonmg ordinance because it 
allegedly excluded low and moderate mcome housmg. They as­
52. See generally note 185 mfra. 
53. Since "[t]he power of Congress to make exclUSive [in the federal courts] 
any valid grant of Junsdiction has hardly been m Issue, it would appear that Con­
gress could properlv condition state court exercise of authority over federal claims 
with an attorney fee proVISIOn. P BATOR, P MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, 
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 418 (2d 
ed. 1973) [heremafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. 
54. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
55. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismIssed, cert. dented, 423 U.S. 808 
(1975). 
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serted claIms based on the equal protection clause of the state and 
federal constitutIons and on the New Jersey zomng enabling stat­
ute. In Washmgton v. Davts,56 the plaIntiffs Instituted a federal 
court action challengmg, as raCIally discnmInatory the hmng prac­
tices of the DIstnct of ColumbIa police department. They alleged 
claIms based on the due process clause of the fifth amendment, 
sectIon 1981 of title 42, and the DIstnct of ColumbIa Code. 
In these illustrative cases, the plaIntiffs challenged the defen­
dants conduct on several grounds, each of whICh was adequate to 
support a Judgment m plaIntiffs favor. If the 1976 Fees Act had 
been public law at the tIme these cases were decIded, it would 
have applied expressly to one or more, but not all of the claIms al­
leged by the plaIntiffs. If those law suits had tennmated m favor of 
the plaIntiffs on a ground or grounds not explicitly covered by the 
Fees Act, they would have presented the Issue to whIch thIS artIcle 
IS addressed. 
CongreSSIOnal proponents of the Fees Act recognIZed that 
multI-claIm litIgatIon Involvmg both fee and non-fee claIms mIght 
be resolved on a ground not covered by the Act eVen though a 
covered claIm was also available as a baSIS for dispOSIng of the case. 
To deal with that questIon, the House JudiCIary Committee In­
cluded a footnote In its report whICh sought to address that Issue 
and to gIVe gmdance to the courts when confronted with such 
cases. 57 It should be noted that the footnote In the House report IS 
the only reference m the entIre legIslatIve hIstory whIch speaks to 
that Issue. Because of the Importance of that text to our diSCUSSIOn, 
it IS quoted In full here: 
To the extent a plallltiff Joms a chum under one of the statutes 
enumerated m H.R. 15460 [the House eqmvalent of the Senate 
bill whIch became the public law] with a claIm that does not al­
low attorney fees, that plaIntiff, if it prevails on the non-fee 
claIm, IS entitled to a determmatlOn on the other claIm for the 
purpose of awarding counsel fees. Morales v. Hames 486 F.2d 
880 (7th Cir. 1973). In some mstances, however, the chum with 
fees may lllvolve a constitutIOnal question whICh the courts are 
reluctant to resolve if the non-constittmonal [SfC] claIm IS disposl­
hve. Hagans v. Lavme, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). In such cases, if 
the claim for whICh fees may be awarded meets the substantial­
ity test, see Hagans v. Lavme, supra; United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), attorney s fees may be allowed even 
56. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 

57 H.R. REP supra note 5, at 4 n.7. 
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though the court declines to enter Judgment for the plamtiff on 
that chum, so long as the plamtiff prevails on the non-fee chum 
ansmg out of a common nucleus of operative fact. United Mine 
Workers v. Gibbs, supra at 725. 58 
ThIS language m the House Report addresses two distinct cate­
gones of cases whICh anse m multI-claIm litIgatIon. The first cate­
gory encompasses those suits m whIch none of the claIms mvolves 
a questIon of federal constitutIOnal law That IS, all of the claIms m­
volve Issues of federal statutory or common law or Issues ansmg 
under state law (constitutIOnal, statutory or common). The first 
sentence of the footnote m the House Report, quoted above, was 
desIgned to address that type of case. The second category em­
braces those multI-claIm lawsuits m whIch one or more but not all 
of the claIms IS based on a prOVISIon of the federal constitutIOn. Be­
cause of the rule whICh reqmres that non-constitutIonal, dispositIve 
claIms be resolved before reachmg the constitutIOnal Issue, m 
many cases the constitutIOnal questIon will never be decIded. The 
second and thIrd sentences of the footnote seek to establish a rule 
of decIsIon for thIS kmd of case. ThIS artIcle will exam me both cate­
gones of cases whICh anse m federal and state courts. The federal 
court decIsIons will be exammed m part V and the state court cases 
m part VI. 
V MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
A. The Doctnne of Pendent ]unsdictwn 
Any diSCUSSIOn of attorney fee awards m multIple claIm cases 
m federal courts must begm with an exammatIon of the pendent 
JunsdictIon doctnne. The modem doctnne of pendent JunsdictIon 
traces its lineage at least to Osborn v. Bank of the United States,59 
deCIded by the Supreme Court m 1824. In that case, the Bank of 
the United States sued OhIO offiCIals m federal court to restraIn 
them from collectmg a tax levIed on the bank by the OhIO legIsla­
ture. Notwithstanding a federal court mJunctIon restrammg the en­
forcement of the state taxmg act, the defendants seIzed $100,000 of 
the bank s assets to satIsfy the assessment. The bank amended its 
complamt to seek recovery of the seIzed funds on the ground that 
58. Id. 
59. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS § 19, at 72 (3d ed. 1976); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary JUriS­
diction: Towards SynthesIs of the Two Doctnnes, 22 U CAL. L. A. L. REV 1263 
(1975). 
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the statute taxmg the bank was unconstitubonal on the authority of 
M'Culloch v. Maryland. 60 Wribng for the Court, ChIef Jusbce 
Marshall expansIvely defined the scope of the ansmg under" JUns­
dicbon of artIcle III: 
We thmk, then, that when a question to whICh the Judicial 
power of the Umon IS extended by the constitutIOn, forms an m­
gredient of the ongInal cause, it IS m the power of Congress to 
gIVe the [Federal courts] JUrIsdictIOn of that cause, although 
other questions of fact or of law may be mvolved mit. 61 
Although the case may be read as raIsmg no state law Issues at 
all,62 later decIsIons relied m part on the Marshall dicta to extend 
federal court Junsdicbon to embrace clrums separately grounded m 
state and federal law 
In Hurn v. Oursler 63 for example, a leading case decIded a 
few years before the adopbon of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure, the plamtiff sued to enJom the defendants from producmg a 
play whICh the plruntiff clrumed mfrmged its copyrIght. The com­
plrunt alleged a VIOlatIOn of the federal copynght statute and a state 
unfrur competibon law The tnal court dismIssed the federal copy­
nght clrum on the merits and the state unuur competitIon claIm for 
want of JunsdictIon. The Supreme Court affirmed, but modified, 
the lower court Judgment dismIssmg the state clrum on the merits, 
not for want of JunsdictIOn. The Court distInguIshed, for federal 
60. 17 u.s. (4 Wheat.) at 316. 
61. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823. 
62. In related case decided on the same day as Osborn, the plalntifT Bank ap­
parently relied entirely on state law for its claims against the defendant based on as­
signed promissory notes. Bank of the United States Planters Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 904 (1924). Furthermore, In his dissenting opinIOn In Osborn, Justice 
Johnson charactenzed the complaint of the Bank as nothing more than traditIOnal 
common law action for trespass or to recover illegally seized property both of whICh 
were governed by state, not federal law. Osborn Bank of the United States, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 871. Apparently Justice Johnson Viewed the federal question (Le., 
the unconstitutionality of the state law taxing the Bank) as entenng the case only bv 
way of replication by the Bank to defense based on the state statute. In later years, 
the Court held that the general federal question JunsdictlOnal statute, enacted In 
1875, did not authonze federal courts to entertain suits In which the federal question 
arose by way of rejOinder to an anticipated defense. Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 
586 (1888); accord, LOUisville & N.R.R. Mottley 211 U.S. 149 (1908). The Metcalf 
OpinIOn, however, did not address the scope of the anslng under language In arti­
cle III, the question to whICh the Marshall dicta IS directed. See Railroad Co. 
MiSSISSIPPI, 102 U.S. 135 (1880) (under the 1875 statute, the federal court has Juns­
diction of case removed from state court where the federal question anses by way 
of the defense). 
63. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). 
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JunsdictIOnal purposes, cases m whIch state and federal grounds 
are asserted m support of a smgle cause of action from those suits 
m whICh the state and federal grounds constitute "two separate and 
distinct causes of action. "64 In Hurn, the Court held that the plam­
tiff had merely alleged two separate grounds, one based on federal 
law and the other on state law m support of a smgle cause of ac­
tion. It concluded that the lower federal court had Junsdictlon 
over the state and federal clrums and should have decIded both. 
The Court added, however that the federal court did not have 
pendent JunsdictIon over the plamtiff's state unfaIr competitIOn 
clrum ansmg out of defendant's use of an uncopynghted, unpub­
lished verSIon of the copynghted play because thIS clrum was sep­
arate and distinct" from the JunsdictIOn-confernng federal copy­
nght clrum. By tymg federal JunsdictIon over non-federal clrums to 
the notion of a smgle cause of action," the Court created a rule 
whICh the lower federal courts struggled with followmg the deCI­
SIon m H urn 65 
AdoptIon of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure m 1938 lrud 
the groundwork for a redefinition of the scope of the federal Judi­
Cial power m cases mvolvmg federal and non-federal questIons. 66 
Among other thmgs, the rules merged law and equity mto one CIvil 
actIon,67 proVIded for liberal Jomder of claIms and partIes,68 and ef­
fected other reforms rumed at litIgatmg all clrums among the parties 
In one law suit. 69 In 1966, the Supreme Court relied heavily on 
64. Id. at 246. The Court abjured defimng cause of action In terms of the 
facts necessary to establish the claIm. See generally, Note, The Concept of Law-Tied 
Pendent Junsdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger ReconsIdered, 87 YALE L.J. 627 (1978). It 
did, however, underscore that the claIms of mfnngement and unfaIr competition so 
precIsely rest upon IdentIcal facts as to be little more than the eqUIvalent of different 
epithets to charactenze the same group of cIrcumstances. 289 U.S. at 246. Earlier m 
the OpinIOn, the Court also found that the two grounds were dependent upon the 
same facts. Id. at 244. ThIS focus on the facts would later proVIde, perhaps unwit­
tingly the underplnmng for the Court' reformulation of the pendent Junsdiction 
doctnne m requmng that the claims anse out of common nucleus of operative 
fact. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (emphaSIS added). 
65. "By the first thIrd of the 20th century however, the phrase [cause of actIOn] 
had become so encrusted with doctrmal complexity that the authors of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure eschewed it altogether. DaVIS v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 
2264, 2272 (1979). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 59, § 19, at 73; Comment, 
supra note 59. 
66. UMW Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 717 (1966). 
67 "There shall be one fonn of action to be known as CIvil actIOn. FED. R. 
Crv P 2. 
68. Id. 18 (JOinder of claIms and remedies); Id. 20 (pennlsslve Jomder of par­
ties); Id. 21 (mlsJomder and non-JOInder of partIes). 
69. FED. R. Crv P 13 (counterclaim and cross-claIm); Id. 14 (thIrd-party prac­
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the modermzatIon of the federal rules of practice when it re­
formulated the doctrme of pendent junsdictIon. In the semmal 
case of Untted Mine Workers v. Gibbs 70 the Court noted the diffi­
culties expenenced by the lower federal courts m applymg the 
Hum cause of action doctnne. Refernng to the rules and the 
tendency of its earlier cases to reqUlre a plamtiff to Jom all related 
claIms m one action, the Court held that junsdictIon, m an article 
III sense, eXIsts if the relationshIp between the federal and state 
claIms permits the conclUSIOn that the entIre actIOn before the 
court compnses but one constitutional case. "71 
After surmountmg the constitutional objection to a more ex­
panSIve VIew of pendent junsdictIon, the Court m Gibbs artie 
ulated the critena by whICh to determme, m any gIven suit, 
whether the federal and state claIms do mdeed constitute one 
constitutional case. With the vaganes of cause of action un­
doubtedly m mmd, the Court adopted a two-pronged test to deter 
mme when non-federal claIms (those whICh do not have an mde­
pendent baSIS for federal junsdictIon) may properly be asserted m 
federal court.72 First, the federal claIm whICh prOVIdes the mde­
tice); Id. 15 (amended and supplemental pleadings); Id. at 22 (interpleader); Id. 24 
(interventIon); Id. 42 (consolidation). 
70. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
71. Id. at 725. Although the Gibbs opmlOn IS vulnerable on several grounds, 
perhaps its most obvIOUS flaw IS the Court' reversal of the usual analYSIS whICh ad­
dresses statutory Issues before exammmg constitutlOnal questions. See generally 
Shakman, The New Pendent JUrisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV 262 
(1968). PrIor to determInIng the scope of the word case m article III, it should 
have studied the Junsdictional statute to see whether Congress mtended to confer 
pendent JUrIsdictIOn and m what measure. If the statutory grant reached the state 
claim, only then would it be necessary to deCIde whether that grant was withIn the 
confines of article III. One commentator has suggested that Aldinger may have un­
dermIned Gibbs by reqUirIng the plamtiff affirmatively to show that Congress m­
tended m the JUrIsdictIOnal statute to permit the assertion of the particular pendent 
claim m question. Aldinger Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Comment, Aldinger v. 
Howard and Pendent JUrisdiction, 77 COLUM. L. REV 127 (1977). The thrust of 
Aldinger as later amplified by the Court m Owen EqUip. & Erection Co. Kroger, 
437 U.S. 365 (1978), does not, In thiS author Judgment, go quite that far. Rather 
Aldinger and Kroger appear to create presumption m favor of pendent JUrIsdiction 
whICh IS rebutted by showmg that Congress mtended to exclude particular pen­
dent claim or party from the scope of federal JUrIsdiction. 
72. A lively debate has developed over whether the Gibbs test IS two-pronged 
or three-pronged. It has arIsen because JustIce Brennan, after noting the substantI­
ality and common nucleus factors, added: "[blut if, considered without regard to 
thelf federal or state character, plamtiff' claims are such that he would ordinarily 
be expected to try them all m one Judicial proceeding, then, assummg substantiality 
of the federal Issues, there IS power m the federal courts to hear the whole. 383 
U.S. at 725 (footnote omitted) (emphaSIS m ongmal). Two distingUished commenta­
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pendent baSIS for JUrIsdictIon must have substance sufficient to 
confer subject matter junsdictIon. "73 Second, the federal and non­
federal claims must denve from a common nucleus of operatIve 
£ac.t "74 
Eight years later the Court clarified the first branch of the test 
by explicatmg more preCisely what it meant by a claim of suffi­
cient substance. In Hagans v. Lavtne 75 the Court SaId thiS 
standard reqUIred only that the federal claim be one that IS not 
obVIOusly fnvolous, or absolutely devOId of merit, or wholly 
msubstantIal. "76 The relatIvely low quantum of "federalness" need-
tors relYIng on the ordinarily be expected to try language, maintain that thiS ele­
ment IS cumulative to the other two factors. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 
3567, at 445; accord, Note, Pendent Party JUrisdictIOn: The DemIse of Doctrine? 
27 DRAKE L. REV 361, 364-65 (1977-78). But other commentators are equally certain 
that Gibbs announced only two-pronged test, with the above quoted sentence 
servIng as an alternative formulation. E.g., Baker, Toward Relaxed View of Federal 
Ancillary and Pendent JUrisdiction, 33 U PITT. L. REV 759, 764-65 (1972); accord, 
Comment, supra note 59, at 1272. ThiS author agrees with the view that Gibbs 
adopted two-pronged test simply because, In the critical sentence quoted above, 
Justice Brennan repeats the reference to the substantiality test, thus suggesting 
that the ordinarily be expected to try standard IS alternative. In any event, as the 
legislative history of the Fees Act demonstrates, Congress adopted two-pronged 
test, based on its understanding of the Gibbs-Hagans line, for the purpose of 
awarding attorneY fees, not to determine Junsdiction. Thus it makes no difference for 
present purposes what the Court really Intended In Gibbs. 
73. 383 U.S. at 725. 
74. Id. 
75. 415 U.S. 528 (1974). 
76. Id. at 536-37 (quoting from line of its earlier declSlons). When the defen­
dant moves to dismiSS the complaint because the federal questIOn IS "insubstantial" 
or "fnvolous the court, In ruling on that motion, looks only to the plamtiff' allega­
tions. Rosado v. Wvman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). Thus the plaIntiff need not demon­
strate Junsdiction over the pnmarv claim at all stages as prereqUisite to resolution 
of the pendent claim. [d. at 405 (footnote omitted). ThiS approach IS little more than 
an application of the well-pleaded complaint" rule whICh the Court has applied to 
resolve subject matter Junsdiction questions. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. Red 
Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) (Junsdictional amount); Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 
586 (1888) ("ansIng under questions); Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 
(1824) (diversitv of citizenship). In each case, the Court held that Junsdiction de­
pends on the state of things when the action IS brought. Osborn Bank of the 
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 824. That after vesting, it cannot be ousted by 
subsequent events. Mollan Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 539 (1824); accord, 
Mosher v. City of Phoemx, 287 U.S. 29 (1932) ("JunsdictlOn IS thus determined by 
the allegations of the [complaint] and not by the way the facts tum out or by deCI­
sIOn of the merits Id. at 30). In view of proVISIOn In the JudiCiary Act of 1875, the 
rule might have been the other way that IS, that federal court Junsdiction could be 
ousted by subsequent events. JudiCiary Act of 1875, Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. Section 
five of the 1875 Act reqUired dismissal of suit commenced In Federal court at any 
time after such suit IS brought" if it does not really and substantiallv Involve 
dispute or controversy properly within the JunsdictlOn of the court. Id. § 5 (empha­
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ed to satIsfy thIs mInImal reqmrement led JustIce Rehnqmst In hIS 
dissent to characterIze the standard as permittmg JUrIsdictIon 
whenever the "plaIntiff IS able to plead hIS claim with a straight 
face."77 
B. Pendent Junsdiction and the 1976 Fees Act 
Although the Gibbs case Involved a state claim pendent to a 
federal statutory claIm78 and Hagans mvolved a federal statutory 
SIS added); see Gold-Washing & Water Co. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877) (dictum) 
(federal court suit may be dismissed if it later appears that disposition of the case 
does not depend upon the construction of federal law or the Constitution). Even 
though that language remained In the United States Code until 1948, when it was re­
moved as unnecessary the Supreme Court nonetheless adhered to the well­
pleaded complaint" rule through those years. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 53, 
at 837 
The Supreme Court has also held, however, that other JUrisdictional attacks, 
such as the absence of Justiciable controversy (e.g., standing to sue or mootness), 
remain open throughout the litigation and are subject to later developments. E.g., 
County of Los Angeles v. DaVIS, 440 U.S. 625 (1979) (mootness). The Court appar­
ently has not reconciled these disparate rules regarding challenges to federal court 
JUrisdiction, except to advance the suggestion In Rosado, that substantiality differs 
from mootness because of the timing element. 397 U.S. at 403. A distinctIOn be­
tween the two categories of cases may be drawn along constitutional lines. Cases 
involVing attacks on ,the JUrisdictional amount, for example, do not Implicate article 
III limitations, but merely congressIOnal policy Judgments. In contrast, defense that 
the action IS not case or controversy I.e., JustiCiability within the meanmg of ar­
ticle III Implicates the scope of the constitutional grant of power. But even that dis­
tinction loses its force when it IS recalled that federal courts, which are created by 
act of Congress, must look to the statute as the warrant for their authority' certainly 
they cannot go beyond the statute, and assert an authority with whICh thev may not 
be Invested by it, or whICh may be clearly demed to them, Cary Curtis, 44 U.S. 
(3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). 
77 415 U.S, at 564. Because he thought the JUrisdiction-conferring constitu­
tional claim was so weak and msubstantial, Justice RehnqUist qUipped that "thiS 
seems to be claSSIC case of the statutory tail wagging the constitutional dog. Id. 
Indeed some of the earlier precedents reqUired that the federal question be real 
and substantial, whICh seemed to Impose something more than the mlmmal test of 
Hagans. McCam DesMomes, 174 U.S, 168, 181 (1899). The formulation In McCain 
denved from the general federal questIOn JUrisdictional statute, enacted In 1875, 
whICh authOrized the federal tnal courts to dismiSS an ongmal suit or remand re­
moved suit to the state court if "it shall appear to the satisfactIOn of said [federal] 
court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit 
does not really and substantially mvolve dispute or controversy properly withm 
the JUrisdiction of Said [federal] court. The JudiCiary Act of 1875, Ch. 137 § 5, 18 
Stat. 470, 472 (emphaSIS added). Although thiS prOVISIOn was omitted from the 1948 
recodification of the JudiCial Code as unnecessary the federal courts continued to 
apply the substantiality test after 1948. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 53, at 837 
(quoting from the legislative hlstorv of the recodificatIOn). Perhaps that omiSSIOn un­
derlays Justice Harlan observation that the standard IS maxim more ancient than 
analytically sound. Rosado Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970). 
78. 383 U.S. at 715. 
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chum pendent to a federal constitubonal claIm,79 the standard un­
der the 1976 Fees Act does not draw any distmcbons among the 
different types of cases whICh mIght arIse under the pendent JUrIS­
dicbon doctrIne. 8o The 1976 Act adopts the two-pronged Gibbs 
test, employed to determme pendent JUrIsdictIon, only as a rule for 
the courts to apply m awarding fees m mulb-clalm litIgatIon 
mvolvmg a federal constitubonal Issue. Whether the non-con­
stitutIOnal Issue has an mdependent JunsdictIonal baSIS IS totally Ir 
relevant for purposes of awarding counsel fees. Thus, fees may be 
awarded if the plamtiff prevails on a non-fee claIm, whether it 
arIses out of state law or federal statutory or common law so long 
as it IS properly Jomed with a federal constitutIOnal claIm. 
The SIgnificance of thIS pomt should not be underestImated 
because it IS not uncommon for non-constitutIonal claIms 10 multI­
claIm litigatIon to have an mdependent JunsdictIOnal base. Nothmg 
m the legislatIve hIstory of the Fees Act mdicates that Congress at­
tributed any SIgnificance to the reality that some non-constitutIonal 
claIms could stand alone as a baSIS for federal court JUrIsdictIon. 
Congress adopted the pendent JunsdictIon test for fee awards to 
accommodate the congressIOnal policy of promotmg pnvate en­
forcement of the cIvil rIghts acts and the JudicIal policy of not un­
necessarily deCIding federal constitutIonal Issues. 81 In thIS sense, it 
may be SaId that "the House report strikes a sensible and reason­
able balance between two Important federal poliCIes. "82 
C. Multi-Clatm LitlgatIOn Not Involvtng ConstitutIOnal Issues 
When conduct IS challenged as vIolatIve of one of the statutes 
covered by the Fees Act and no constitutIonal claIm IS mvolved, it 
IS not uncommon for the plamtiff to assert additIonal federal 
or state claIms whICh do not have attorney fee prOVlSlons. The 
questIon arIses whether counsel fees may be awarded when the 
case IS deCIded on the non-fee claIm. With respect to the scope of 
federal court JUrIsdictIon, the Gibbs-Hagans doctrme applies to al­
low the plamtiff to Jom claIms whICh do not have an mdependent 
baSIS of JUrIsdictIon. 83 In Gibbs, the Supreme Court authOrIzed the 
79. 415 u.s. at 528. 
80. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). 
81. Gagne Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979); 
see White v. Beal, 447 F Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
82. Southeast Legal Defense Group Adams, 436 F Supp. 891, 895 (D. Or. 
1977). 
83. 415 U.S. at 528; 383 u.S. at 715. 
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Jomder of a state law claim, whICh could not otherwIse be brought 
m federal court, to a federal statutory claIm whICh was properly m 
the federal court. 84 In Hagans the Court, relymg on Gibbs ap­
proved the Jomder of a dependent federal statutory claim to an m­
dependent (JurIsdichon-conferrmg) constitutIOnal claIm. 85 Thus, so 
long as the plamtiff can satIsfy the two critena of the Gibbs-Hagans 
test, she may Jom other federal and state claIms whICh do not have 
mdependent JUrIsdictIonal bases. 
The first sentence of footnote 7 m the House Report seeks to 
provIde a governmg standard for determmmg whether fees should 
be awarded m thIs category of cases when the Judge, or JUry de­
CIdes the case on the non-fee claIm.86 In these cases, smce no con­
stitutIonal questIon IS mvolved, the court IS free to decIde the case 
on any or all grounds. It may gIve complete relief on one ground, 
pretermittmg declSlon on the other claIms. If the plamtiff, how­
ever, prevails on a non-fee claIm alone, she "is entitled to a deter 
mmatIon of the [fee] claIm for the purpose of awarding counsel 
fees."87 Because the fee claIm does not mvolve any constitutIonal 
84. 383 U.S. at 715. 
85. 415 U.S. at 528. 
86. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 4 n.7 
87 Id. The first sentence of the footnote relies on Morales Hames, 486 F.2d 
880 (7th Cir. 1973), remanded, [1974] EQ. OPPTY. IN Hous. (P-H) ~ 13,677 at 14,383 
(N.D. Ill. 1974), as authority to support the policv requIrIng the Judge to decide the 
fee claim covered by the Act if the Judge IS mclined to dispose of the case on the 
non-fee claim (in cases where neither claim Involves constitutional question). In 
Morales, black plamtiff sued local offiCials to enJom ban on the construction of 
federally subSidized housmg, allegmg racial and economic discnmmatlOn m VIOla­
tion of constitutional and statutory proscnptions. The tnal Judge held that the con­
struction ban constituted "financial discnmmatlOn m vIOlation of the equal protec­
tion clause. Id. at 881. He made no finding of racial discnmmation, denvmg the 
plamtiff any damages or attorney fees. Id. at 882. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
held that the distnct court should have decided the racial discnmmation claim be­
cause plaintiff' request for damages and counsel fees depended on it. Id. It re­
manded the case for that detennmation, whICh the Judge ultimately made m the 
plamtiff' favor by awarding damages and fees. [1974] EQ. OPPTY. IN Hous. (P-H) ~ 
13,677 at 14,383 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Techmcally, the tnal court should never have de­
Cided the constitutional claim before addressmg the statutory claims. If that tradi­
tional path had been followed, the question In Morales would not have ansen be­
cause at least two of the statutory claims were "fee-claims. The Supreme Court 
eventually disapproved that part of Morales whICh relied on the pnvate attorney 
general" exception to the Amencan Rule forbidding attorney fees unless unauthor­
Ized by statute. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Corp. Wilderness Soc v, 421 U.S. 240, 270 
n.46 (1975). In any event, the congressIOnal purpose, m referencmg Morales, IS to 
give the plamtiff the nght to deCISion on her fee claim whenever the tnal court 
may dispose of the case on non-fee ground. See Save Our Sound Fishenes Ass 
Callaway 429 F Supp. 1136 (D.R.1. 1977) (in deciding the case on the merits, the 
court found it unnecessary to detennme whether it had Junsdiction of claims based 
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Issue, it may be decIded without VIolence to the federal policy 
agamst decIding constitutIOnal questions when non-constitution­
al grounds are dispositIve. 88 No cases have been decIded under 
the 1976 Fees Act whICh mvoke thIs branch of the fee-non-fee 
problem. 
An mterestmg line of deCISIOns IS developmg, however, 
whIch IS related to thIs category of cases. Bunn v. Central Realty 
of LOUlszana 89 IS illustrative. In thIs case, the plamtiff sued the 
defendant for raCIal discnmmatIon m housmg, basmg hIS chums on 
sectIOn 1982 and the Federal FaIr Housmg Act. 90 The distnct court 
found discnmmatIon, but did not mdicate whICh statutory prOVlSlon 
the defendant VIolated. The Judge demed plamtiff's motion for 
counsel fees because under the Federal FaIr Housmg Act only 
plamtiffs who are not finanCially able to assume Said attorney s 
fees may recover them. 91 
The court of appeals reversed the demal of attorney fees. It 
held that the distnct court should have awarded them under the 
1976 Fees Act because the plamtiff had alleged and proved a VIOla­
tion of sectIon 1982, one of the statutes covered by the legIslation. 
FOllowmg the legIslatIve hIstory and its pnor declSlons under the 
1976 Act, the court further held that counsel fees should ordinarily 
be awarded unless speCIal CIrcumstances render the award un­
JUst. 92 Even though the FaIr Housmg Act demes fees to a plamtiff 
on two environmental statutes; when the prevailing plaintiff applied for counsel fees, 
however, the court then deCided the Junsdictional question under the envIronmental 
laws because they were the only claims under whICh the plaintiff could recover its 
attorney fees). 
88. Southeast Legal Defense Group Adams, 436 F Supp. 891, 895 (D. Or. 
1977). It should be noted that, even though the fee may techmcallv be awarded on 
the baSIS of the covered" claim, the plaintiff may still be able to recover fee for 
the time spent on the non-fee claim. See generally note 130 and accompanvlng 
text mfra. Because of the "interrelated nature of the claims, it may be difficult In 
some cases to Isolate the time spent on the "fee-claim. Lund v. Affieck, 442 F 
Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.R.I. 1977). Where there IS no Indication at all In the statute 
authonzlng fee award nor m its legislative history that Congress mtended to en­
courage JOinder of fee and non-fee claims, the courts will exclude from the attorney 
fee computatIOn the amount of time devoted to, for example, non-covered state law 
ground. E.g., Baughman Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 
1978) (plaintiff who was successful on Sherman Act antitrust claim cannot recover 
counsel fees for time spent on related state law claim). 
89. 592 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979); accord, Dillon v. A.F.B.I.C. Dev. Corp., 597 
F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979). 
90. 592 F.2d at 892. 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). 
92. The strong presumption In the 1976 legislation authonzlng fees to pre­
vailing plaintiff IS based In part on Supreme Court deCISIOns. Northcross v. MemphiS 
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who can afford them, the Fifth Circuit said that ability to pay does 
not qualify as specIal cIrcumstances under the 1976 legIslatIon. 
Bunn and the related cases m thIs line of precedent hold that, 
even though one or more of the plamtiff's claims may be covered 
by other fee prOVISIOns, the courts should apply the more liberal 
standards of the 1976 Fees Act whenever the plaintiff prevails on a 
claim covered by it. 93 
D Multt-Clatm Littgatwn Involvtng Constitutwnal Issues 
The second category of cases to be explored mvolves those m 
whICh one or more of the plamtiff" s claims rest upon a nght se­
cured or protected by the United States ConstitutIon, while other 
claims are non-constitutIonal m nature. These cases are, of course, 
limited to those suits m whICh the defendants are public offiCIals or 
other persons actmg under color of state law 94 Although each of 
the statutory proVISIOns covered by the 1976 Fees Act mIght be 
available m some state actIon cases, sectIon 1983 IS the most fre­
quently mvoked of these prOVlSlons when challengmg the constitu­
tIOnality of conduct taken under color of state law Because of its 
breadth and frequency of mvocatIon, thIS diSCUSSIOn will focus on 
that prOVlSlon of the CIvil nghts laws. 
The archetypal sectIon 1983 case IS a suit m whIch welfare re­
CIpIents are challengmg a local or state eligibility rule denymg 
them some benefit as vIOlatIve of the Federal SOCial Security Act 
(and Implementmg regulatIons) and of the equal protectIon or due 
Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973); Newman v. Piggle Park Enterpnses, Inc., 390 U.S. 
400 (1968). 
93. See note 89 supra. See also Hughes Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978); 
Wharton Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977). Cj Johnson Snyder, 470 F Supp. 
972 (N.D. OhIO 1979) (VIOlation of FaIr Housmg Act and 1866 Civil Rights Act); 
White Ed Miller & Sons, Inc., 457 F Supp. 148 (D. Neb. 1978) (discharge from 
employment due to race). Contra, Crumble Blumenthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
94. Although thiS article has assumed that the rule contamed m the second and 
thIrd sentences of footnote seven of the House Report would apply onlv m actions 
asserting constitutional claims agamst public offiCIals or other persons acting under 
color of law it may be that the rule will also applv to actions agamst pnvate persons 
under § 1985(3). See note 58 supra; see text accompanymg note 21 supra. The argu­
ment would proceed somethmg like thiS: T the extent that the scope of the four­
teenth amendment nghts IS one element of § 1985(3) claim, as some courts have 
held, then the determmation of that element would mvolve the deCISion of constI­
tutional" question withm the meanmg of the second and third sentences of footnote 
seven. See note 57 supra. In such mstances, the court should pretermit that determi­
nation if the case can be disposed of on wholly non-constitutional ground. 
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 95 In earlier years, the 
tYPICal case mvolved a pnvate company attackmg a state agency 
rate-fixmg order as vIOlatmg state law and the fourteenth amend­
ment. 96 It has long been the rule that, m such mstances, the fed­
eral courts should decIde the non-constitutIonal federal or state 
claims before reachmg the constitutional Issues. 97 "It IS not the 
habit of the court to decIde questions of a constitutIonal nature un­
less absolutely necessary to a decIsIOn of the case. "98 
To date, the federal cases decIded under the Fees Act have m­
volved non-constitutIonal claims ansmg from both state and federal 
sources. The rule of deCISIOn for awarding attorney fees set out m 
the House Report does not distmgUIsh between dispositive claIms 
based on state or federal law For purposes of awarding attorney 
fees m this type of multi-claim litigatIOn mvolvmg a federal consti­
tutional Issue, the House Report lumps together the cases m­
volvmg non-constitutIOnal federal claIms with those rooted m state 
law What the report does do, however, IS adopt as the rule of de­
CISIOn the test for pendent junsdictIon, formulated by the Supreme 
Court m the Gibbs and Hagans cases to determme when federal 
court plamtiffs may attach to theIr junsdictlOn-confernng claIms 
other contentions, either state or federal, whICh do not have an m­
dependent baSIS of junsdictlOn. 
1. Related Federal ClaIms 
Before discussmg the key cases that have been decIded under 
the Act on this pomt, it IS Important to note one other considera­
tion that affects the applicatIOn of the pendent junsdictIOn doctnne 
to the award of counsel fees under the 1976 Act. Many suits 
agamst non-federal governmental officials and others actmg under 
color of state law are based on section 1983, a remedial prOVISIon 
95. E.g., Rosado Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Hagans v. LaVine, 415 U.S. 
at 528. 
96. Siler v. LOUisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). 
97 Id., accord, CinCinnatI Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1930); TownshIp of 
Hillsborough Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629 (1946). State courts have embraced the 
same rule when deCIding federal constitutional Issues In theIr tribunals. E.g., 
Donadio Cunmngham, 58 N.J. 309, 277 A.2d 375 (1971) (constitutional question IS 
not to be deCIded unless absolutely Imperative In the disposition of the litigation"); 
Binder v. TrIangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 53 (1973) (constitutional 
Issues should not be resolved if it IS not essential to determinatIon of the case). 
98. Burton United States, 196 U.S. 283 (1904); accord, 415 U.S. at 528 (non­
constitutional federal statutory ground); Siler LOUisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 
(1909) (non-constitutional state law ground). 
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whICh authonzes suits for the depnvatIon of nghts, pnvileges, or 
ImmunitIes secured by the ConstitutIon and laws. "99 The re­
cent declSlon of the Supreme Court m Chapman v Houston Wel­
fare Rtghts Orgamzatwn lOO makes it perfectly plam that thIs provI­
sIon IS not the source of any nghts, but IS merely a remedial deVIce 
to gIve plamtiffs a nght of actIon for certam vIOlatIons committed 
by persons actmg under color of state law Although on numerous 
occaSiOns In the past the Court has assumed that the phrase and 
laws" In sectIon 1983 creates a pnvate nght of actIon for the viOla­
tIon of any federal statute,101 five of the JustIces In Chapman ap­
parently believed that the questIOn was not yet settled. 102 
In contrast, the federal and state appellate courts expressly ad­
dressmg that questIon have uniformly held that sectIon 1983 au­
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 
100. 441 U.S. 600 (1979). 
101. E.g., Edelman Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Hagans v. Lavme, 415 U.S. 
at 528; Rosado Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Citv of Greenwood Peacock, 384 
U.S. 808 (1966). But cf Great Am. Fed. Sav & Loan Ass n Novotny 99 S. Ct. 2345 
(1979). 
102. Justice Stevens, writmg for himself, the Chief Justice and Justices Rehn­
qUist, Blackman, and Powell, was willing only to accept without deCiding that the 
petitioners are correct m assertmg that § 1983 proVides cause of action for all fed­
eral statutorv claims. 441 U.S. at 617 In hiS concurrmg opmlOn (for himself, the 
Chief Justice, and Justice RehnqUlst), Justice Powell held that and laws was 
"intended as no more than shorthand reference to the equal nghts legislation en­
acted by Congress. [d. at 624. In contrast, four Justices (Justice White concurnng, 
and Justice Stewart, for himself. Justice Brennan, and Justice Marshall, dissenting) 
stated theu view that § 1983 does embrace, as general matter, federal statutorY 
nghts. [d. at 672. In footnote (from whICh Justices Brennan and Marshall disasso­
Ciated themselves), of hiS dissenting opmlOn, Justice Stewart stated: "When state 
offiCial IS alleged to have VIOlated federal statute whICh proVides its own compre­
henSive enforcement scheme, the reqUirements of that enforcement procedure may 
not be bypassed by bnngmg suit directly under § 1983. [d. at 673 n.2. That state­
ment became the premise for Justice Stewart' majority opmlOn 111 Great Am. Fed. 
Sav & Loan Ass v. Novotnv 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979) (§ 1985(3) which denves from 
the same post Civil War statute as § 1983, does not proVide remedy for certam VIO­
lations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Whether the Novotny deCISIOn 
will proVide the baSIS for limiting the reach of § 1983 when federal statutorY nghts 
are mvolved IS, of course, unclear at thiS pomt. In dictum several vears ago, the 
Court mdicated that nghts created bv Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (public 
accommodations) could not be asserted through § 1983 because Congress mtended 
title II to be the exclUSive remedv Adickes S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 
n.5 (1970). But see United States Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968) (title II mav be the 
source of nghts to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976), the cnmmal counterpart of § 
1983). In Gagne Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979), 
and Thiboutot State, 405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W 3460 
(Jan. 22, 1980) (No. 79-838), the Supreme Court presently has the opportunitv to ad­
dress the question whether and to what extent § 1983 reaches statutory claims. 
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thonzes pnvate suits based on federal statutes agamst persons act­
mg under color of state law 103 The legIslatIve history of the 1976 
Act mdicates that Congress was well aware of these lower court de­
CISIOns. RepresentatIve Robert Dnnan, the floor manager of the 
bill m the House, stated: "Under applicable JudiCIal deCISIons, Sec­
tIon 1983 authonzes suits agamst State and local officIals based 
upon Federal statutory as well as constitutIonal nghts. "104 Similarly 
the Senate Report noted the availability of sectIon 1983 m suits 
redressmg vIOlatIons of the Federal ConstitutIon or laws. "105 The 
legIslatIve hIstory also con tams several mdirect references to the 
authority under sectIOn 1983 to mitIate suits based on federal statu­
tory vIOlatIons. lOS Thus, In those cIrcuits where sectIon 1983 has 
103. Tongol Usery 601 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1979) (action bv beneficlanes of 
federal unemplovment compensation law challenging the legality of federal regu­
lation forbidding states to waive recoupment of overpaid benefits); Chase 
McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 439 U.S. 965 (1978) (action by 
tribal Indian against local offiCials for refUSing to connect her property to water and 
sewer lines In VIOlation of federal statute; ill dictum, the Court suggested that § 1983 
may not cover all federal statutes); Gonzalez Young, 560 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(action bv welfare reCIpient, based on Social Securitv Act, that state defendants iIIe­
gallv demed her emergencv assistance); Sanders Comne, 506 F.2d 530 (10th Cir. 
1974) (action bv person In custody against state offiCials alleging vIOlation of the 
federal extradition statute); Blue Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974) (action bv 
welfare reCIpients, under Social Security Act, challenging the failure of public offi­
Cials to reimburse their transportation expenses In seeking medical assistance); 
Gomez Flonda State Emplovment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969) (action by 
migrant workers against state offiCials and pnvate persons for VIOlating the Wagner­
Peyser Act whICh provides standards for wages and working conditions); Bomar 
Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947) (action bv school teacher alleging unlawful dis­
missal because of her federal JUry servICe, based on proVISIOn In an Act to codify re­
Vise, and amend the laws relating to the Judiciary of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 275, 
36 Stat. 1165 (formerlv codified at 28 U.S.C. § 411)); Thiboutot State, 405 A.2d 230 
(Me. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W 3460 (Jan. 22, 1980) (No. 79-838) (action 
challenging state welfare regulation redUCing method of calculating payments as VIO­
lative, Inter alia, of federal welfare regulations); see Bond Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 
174 (7th CiL 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978) (in deciding whether fees 
should be awarded under the 1976 Act In an action based on the SOCial Securitv Act, 
the Court noted congressIOnal Intent "that the [Fees] Act extend to statutory claims 
asserted under § 1983"); Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356 (1st Cir. 1974) (per 
cUriam) (the Court assumed that § 1983 created pnvate nght of action for VIOlations 
of the SOCial Security Act). Contra, Wvnn Indiana State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 316 
F Supp. 324 (N.D. Ind. 1970) (action bv welfare recIpients based on SOCial Security 
Act mav not be brought pursuant to § 1983). 
104. 122 CONGo REC. 35122 (1976) (At that pOint In the debate, Rep. Robert 
Drlnan cited with approval the deCISIon In Blue Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 
1974)). 
105. S. REP No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprillted III [1976] 5 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5911-12. 
106. See 122 CONGo REC. 35128 (1976) (remarks of Rep. John Seiberling, the 
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been held to authonze suits based on statutory nghts, the courts 
would not have to apply the two-pronged test set out m the House 
Report to award counsel fees because the plamtiff would have pre­
vailed on a chum ansmg under section 1983, a statute expressly 
covered by the Fees Act. 
The early declSlons under the Fees Act followed thIS reason­
mg. In Gary W v. LOUlStana,107 the plamtiffs represented a class 
of children no longer m the custody of theIr parents, either be­
cause of a court order or because the parents had voluntarily 
permitted the state to assume custody The suit attacked the condi­
tions at the resIdential facilitIes to whICh the children had been as­
sIgned, espeCIally those located beyond the borders of LOUISIana. 
The plamtiffs rested theIr clatms upon the equal protectIon clause 
of the fourteenth amendment and the SOCIal Security Act through 
whICh the state receIved funds for the proper care of the foster 
children. The plamtiffs moved for an award of attorney fees after 
the suit concluded m their favor based upon a federal statutory 
clatm. 
Similarly m La Raza Untda v. Volpe 108 an organIZatIon of 
MexlCan-Amencans sued state and federal offi.ctals to enJom the 
constructIOn of a hIghway whlCh would displace them from theIr 
homes. The plamtiff alleged several clrums based on the federal 
constitutIon, federal statutes, and state law The distnct court IS­
sued a prelimmary mJunctIon based on a federal statutory clrum 
whIch was affirmed on appeal. After the appellate deCISIon, the 
plans for the hIghway "laId largely dormant."109 The plruntiff then 
moved for an award of attorney fees. In both Gary Wand La Raza 
Untda, the distrIct courts held that section 1983 authonzed pnvate 
suits to enforce federal statutory nghts, and that Congress mtended 
the 1976 Fees Act to cover such suits. Counsel fees were awarded 
m both mstances. DeCISIons subsequent to these cases have fol­
lowed thIS approach, although not always expressly 110 
It may be, however that the Supreme Court will eventually 
hold: (1) SectIon 1983 does not create a nght of action for VIOlations 
chIef sponsor of SImilar bill, In support of S. 2278); 122 CONGo REC. 33312-14 
(1976) (remarks of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, one of the Senate floor leaders for the 
bill). 
107 429 F Supp. 711 (E.D. La. 1977). 
108. 440 F Supp. 904 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
109. Id. at 906. 
110. E.g., Gates Collier, 559 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1977); Bond V. Stanton, 555 
F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). 
1979] MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION 219 
of federal statutory nghts; or (2) it covers only equal nghts legIsla­
tion enacted by Congress .111 or (3) it does not even cover "equal 
nghts statutes whICh contam a detailed admInIstrative and Judi­
cial process deSIgned to provIde an opportunity for nonjudicIal and 
nonadversary resolution of claIms. "112 At such time, or m those Clf 
cuits where section 1983 has been so limited, the courts will need 
to follow a three-step process m awarding fees under the Act 
where federal constitutional and statutory claIms are Jomed to­
gether m one action. First, the court will have to deCIde whether 
the statute whICh allegedly IS the source of the plamtiff's claim pro­
vIdes, expressly or Impliedly a nght of action. 113 Second, it must 
deCIde whether it has JunsdictIon over that claIm, either through 
the pendent JunsdictIon doctnne or by an mdependent grant m 
the JudiCIal Code. ThIrd, if the court disposes of the case on the 
non-constitutional statutory ground, then it will have to apply the 
two-pronged test for awarding fees set out m the House Report 
(whether or not the statutory claim rests on an mdependent Juns­
dictional ground). 
2. Related State Claims 
(a) Background 
Frequently a plamtiff will seek to Jom a state claim to her 
federal constitutIOnal claim m a federal court. Over 70 years ago, 
the Supreme Court, without reference to the Osborn case, to ar 
tIcle III, or to the JunsdictIonal statute, approved the practice m 
Siler v. Loutsville & Nashville Railroad. 114 In that case, the plain­
tiff railroad company sued to enJom a maxlffium rate order of the 
Kentucky Railroad CommIssIon, allegmg that it Violated several 
proViSIons of the federal Constitution and exceeded the authority 
conferred upon the CommISSIon by the state enabling statute. The 
lower federal court ruled for the plamtiff based on its con­
sitututIonal claims. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Judgment below solely on 
Ill. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights OrgamzatlOn, 441 U.S. 600, 624 
(1979) (Powell, J., concurnng). 
Il2. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345, 2349 (1979). 
Il3. See generally Cort Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Compare Cannon v. Umver­
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) with Touche Ross & Co. Redington, 99 S. 
Ct. 2479 (1979) and Transamenca Mortgage AdVisors, Inc. (TAMA) LeWIS, 100 S. 
Ct. 242 (1979). 
Il4. 213 U.S. 175 (1909). 
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the basIS of the state law ground, whICh the tnal court did not 
reach, rather than to unnecessarily decIde the vanous constitu­
tional questions appeanng m the record. "U5 It held that federal 
courts, once they acqmre JunsdictIon over a suit, had the nght to 
deCIde all the questions m the case and may dispose of the litiga­
tion on local or state questions only "116 Foreshadowmg the hold­
mg m H urn117 the Court noted m dictum that the tnal court could 
also have disposed of the case on the state law ground even 
though it deCIded the federal questions adversely to the party raIS­
mg them."u8 Through the years, the prmcipies of Siler have not 
been disturbed. As noted earlier m discussmg Gibbs the only ad­
Justment has been to expand federal JunsdictIon by liberalizmg the 
test for Jommg pendent clrums. 
(b) ApplicatlOn of the Rule 
Because state clrums are not covered expressly by the Fees 
Act, it becomes necessary to determme whether and under what 
CIrcumstances counsel fees may be awarded m the Siler-type case 
m whICh a state law claim IS Jomed to a federal constitutional 
clrum. As preVIOusly noted, the House Report provIdes that fees 
may be awarded m cases like Siler where the court disposes of the 
suit on the state law ground, while pretermittmg the federal consti­
tutional Issues. Congress adopted the two-pronged test of pendent 
U5. Id. at 193. Over 20 years earlier, the Court had adopted Similar approach 
when state law and federal constitutional questions anse by way of defense m suits 
removed from state to federal court. Santa Clara County Southern P.R.R., U8 
u.S. 394 (1886). "These questIOns [mvolvmg fourteenth amendment claims] belong 
to class whlCh thiS court should not deCide unless theu determmation IS essential 
to the disposal of the case III whlCh they arise. Id. at 410. In Santa Clara, the Court 
pretennitted the constitutional questions, deCiding the case on state law grounds III 
favor of the defendant. 
U6. 213 U.S. at 191. It appears that Siler was the first case III whlCh the Su­
preme Court squarely addressed the Issue whether, m an orlgmal suit filed III fed­
eral court based on federal question JUrisdiction, the plamtifT may append related 
state claim and have Judgment on it. Much earlier, however, the Court had approved 
such practice m cases removed from state court to federal trial court. See Railroad 
Co. v. MiSSISSIPPI, 102 U.S. 135 (1880). Percelvlllg no distinction between orlgillal 
and removed suits for JUrisdictional purposes, federal cucuit court could, m 1887, 
confidently assert: "It IS the settled law of the supreme court that, when case IS 
presented mvolvmg federal question, the Junsdiction of the court attaches to the 
whole case, and IS not limited to the mere decIsIOn of that smgle federal question. 
Omaha Horse Ry Cable Tram-Way Co., 32 F 727 729 (D. Neb. 1887) (footnote 
omitted). 
117 289 U.S. at 238. 
118. Id. 
221 1979] MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION 
Junsdichon for applicatIOn of the Fees Act m thIS context. 1l9 But 
unless the defendant failed to move to dismISS for lack of Junsdic 
tIon, the court, by the tIme the case concluded, will have already 
applied those standards In takmg JunsdictIon over the state claIm at 
the outset of the litIgatIOn. Thus, if the court enters Judgment for 
the plaIntiff on the state claIm, the award of fees should follow 
automatIcally because the court has already applied the Gibbs­
Hagans test. That IS, the distnct Judge will have determIned that 
the plaIntiff" s constitutIonal claIm IS not InsubstantIal" and that the 
constitutIOnal and state claIms anse out of a common nucleus of 
operatIve fact. "120 
In an early and leading Siler-type case under the Fees Act, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit essentIally 
followed that line of reason mg. In Seals v. Quarterly County 
Court 121 black plamtiffs sued to enJom an at-large system of appor 
tIonment for seats on the Quarterly Court, the elected governmg 
body for countIes m Tennessee. The plaIntiffs alleged that the plan 
diluted mmority votIng strength m vIOlatIon of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth amendments to the United States ConstitutIon. The dis­
tnct court dismIssed the complamt for failure to state a claIm, a 
Judgment whIch was reversed by the court of appeals. 122 When the 
tnal Judge agam dismIssed the complaInt on the merits after re­
mand, the court of appeals agaIn reversed. 123 On thIS occaSIOn, the 
appellate court reserved decIsIon on the constitutIonal questIons to 
permit the plamtiffs to attack the validity of the apportIOnment 
plan based on state law as mterpreted by a recent declSlon of the 
Tennessee Supreme Court. On the second remand, the distnct 
Judge mvalidated the plan based on state law but ruled agaInst the 
plaIntiffs on theIr federal constitutIonal claIms. The court also 
demed request for an award of counsel fees. 
The plaIntiffs took theIr thud appeal to the Sixth Circuit, thIS 
tIme on the attorney fee Issue. First, the court held that the dis­
tnct Judge should not have deCIded the federal constitutIOnal Issue 
because the state law ground was dispositIve. Second, it recogmzed 
the difficulty of the attorney fee Issue, but noted the explicit lan­
guage m the House Report addreSSIng that questIon: 
119. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 4 n.7· see generally text accompanymg notes 
78-82 supra. 
120. UMW Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. 
121. 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977). 
122. 496 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1974). 
123. 526 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1975). 
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Nonetheless, the language [of the House Report] appears to us 
to be a clear-cut mdicatlOn that Congress considered the exact 
problem with whICh we are now confronted and provided an ex­
press mdicatIon as to how the general language of the 1976 stat­
ute was mtended to be applied. Under such circumstance (rela­
tively rare m thiS court's expenence), we, of course, follow con­
gressIOnal mtent. 124 
It then proceeded to apply the two-pronged test, notmg that it had 
already discussed that Issue m its opmIOn on the second appeal. 
The court thus repeated its prevIous holding that the plamtiffs 
constitutIonal claIms were substantIal" and that the federal and 
state claims arose out of a common nucleus of operatIve fact. "125 
Havmg made that determmatIon, as it were for the second time, it 
held that attorney fees were appropnate under the 1976 Act. The 
court remanded the case for the thIrd tIme to the distnct judge to 
assess the amount of the fees. 
Despite the certainty with whICh the court of appeals reached 
its conclusIOn based entIrely on the legislatIve hIstory of the Act, 
one commentator has observed that "it IS unlikely that Congress m­
tended the fee prOVISIon to be used m thIS manner "126 That obser 
vatIon does not take full account of the legIslatIve hIstory relied on 
by the Sixth Circuit, especIally the references to the Gibbs case m 
footnote 7 of the House Report. In relymg on the Gibbs standards 
for pendent junsdictIon, the Congress recognIzed that state claIms 
are properly withm the parameters of the pendent junsdictIon doc­
trme as well as federal statutory claIms under Hagans The Seals 
court found that reference to be a clear-cut mdicatIon that Con­
gress mtended the courts to award fees to prevailing plamtiffs m 
the Siler-type case. 127 Any suggestIon that Congress did not so m­
tend IS a mIsreading of the legIslative hIstory 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has 
followed the Seals case m Siler-type litIgatIon. In Kimbrough v. 
Arkansas Actzmtres Assoczatwn,128 a black hIgh school student sued 
to enJom the defendant aSSOCiatIOn from preventIng hIm from 
playmg football. The student alleged that the eligibility rule of the 
asSOCIatIon vIolated the equal protectIon and due process clauses of 
124. 562 F.2d at 394. 
125. Id. at 392. 
126. Lipson, Beyond Alyeska-Judiclal Response to the Civil Rights Attorney 
Fees Act, 22 ST. LoUIS U.L.I. 243, 248-49 n.35 (1978). 
127 562 F.2d at 394. 
128. 574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978). 
223 1979] MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION 
the fourteenth amendment, and sectIon 1981 of title 42. In 
grantIng a prelimmary mJunctIon, the distnct court held that, be­
cause the defendant's eligibility rule was ambIguous, the plamtiff 
was not barred from playmg football. DeCIding the case on thIS 
state" law ground, the Judge did not reach the plamtiffs federal 
constitutIonal or statutory clalms. It demed, however, the plaln­
tiffs request for counsel fees because the plamtiff did not prevail 
on a clalm covered by the 1976 Act. 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the demal of counsel 
fees. It applied the two-pronged test of substantiality and com­
mon nucleus set out m Seals and m the House Report, whICh the 
court SaId contamed an unambIguous expreSSIOn of congreSSIOnal 
mtent. "129 With regard to these standards, the court of appeals 
noted that the distnct court had Implicitly made the appropn­
ate determmatIons because it disposed of the case on a non-federal 
ground. Thus Kimbrough, like Seals, applied the Fees Act m a rel­
atively automatic fashIOn because the two-pronged test had already 
been satisfied when the distnct court asserted JunsdictIon over the 
non-federal claIm and deCIded the case on that ground. 
While the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and 
Eighth Circuits have followed the congreSSIonal rule,130 one dis­
tnct court has deVIated from it. In Martm v. Hancock,131 the 
plamtiff sued three Mmneapolis police officers under sectIOn 1983 
for illegal arrest, unreasonable force m makmg the arrest, and fail­
mg to keep a police dog under control. The JUry found for the 
plamtiff on the last claim and awarded hIm $2,500. The Judge 
demed a request for counsel fees, charactenzmg the case as "no 
129. Id. at 427. 
130. 574 F.2d at 423; 562 F.2d at 390. A more subtle question, whICh will not 
be explored at length m thiS article, IS whether the court, m calculating the counsel 
fee to be awarded the plamtiff, should mclude the time spent on the constitutional 
Issue even though it did not prOVide baSIS for the judgment. There IS dictum m 
Brown Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978), whICh states that the tnal 
judge should mclude such time otherwise the plamtiff would be penalized for as­
serting constitutional nght. Putting aSide those multi-claim cases mvolvmg consti­
tutional nghts, the defendants have argued unsuccessfully for per se rule whICh 
would forbid compensating the plamtiff for legal services on claims whICh do not 
support the judgment. Although the courts have rejected an absolute rule, they have 
stated that "the degree to whIch counsel prevailed In the lawsuit has become factor 
m determmmg the appropnate amount of attorneys fees to be awarded. Jones 
Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 1027 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphaSIS In ongmal); accord, Brown 
Bathke, 588 F.2d at 634 (so long as claim IS not "fnvolous, the plamtiff may receive 
some compensation for the legal work underlymg it); cf Dawson Pastnck, 600 
F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979) (plamtiff need not prevail on all Issues to recover fees). 
131. 466 F Supp. 454 (D. Minn. 1979). 
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more than a common law negligence dogbite case, clothed as a 
sectIon 1983 constitutIonal claIm. "132 That holding mIsreads the 
legIslatIve hIstory of the Act, for nowhere does it gIVe the court dis­
cretIon to pIck and choose among the kmd of VIOlatIons protected by 
sectIon 1983 for whIch fees may be awarded. But more Important 
for our purposes here, even if the claIm upon whIch the JUry re­
turned its verdict IS properly charactenzed as a common law negli­
gence claIm, the Fees Act would still be applicable because the 
plamtifI alleged a sectIon 1983 constitutIOnal claIm whIch the Judge 
could find to be "not msubstantIal, and arose out of a common 
nucleus of operatIve fact. "133 
On the other hand, cases like Martin 134 lend some support to 
the fears expressed by the defendant III Seals (and m Siler and 
Gibbs) that the federal courts will now become the forum for 
"purely state litigatIon whenever the defendants have acted under 
color of law 135 The Sixth Circuit III Seals rejected that argument 
because it believed the two-pronged test provIded a suffiCIent safe­
guard. 136 But if JustIce Rehnqmst IS nght that all the plamtiff need 
do IS plead hIS [constitutional] claIm with a straIght face,"137 then 
perhaps those safeguards will not deter the "federalizmg" of nearly 
132. Id. at 456; cf Zarcone Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) (in af­
firmmg denial of attorney fees m case where Judge ordered vendor arrested 
and handcuffed for servmg putnd" coffee, the court of appeals charactenzed the 
plamtiff' case as an essentially pnvate Injury echOing the distnct Judge descnp­
tion of it as "baSically tort action for false arrest and Impnsonment couched In the 
language of the constitutional nght to due process. Zarcone Perry, 438 F Supp. 
788, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)). T the extent that cases like Zarcone and Buxton v. Patel, 
595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979), have denied prevailing plaintiff an award of attorney 
fees because the damage remedy was suffiCient to attract competent counsel, those 
deCISIons are contrary to the legislative history of the Fees Act. "Of course, it should 
be noted that the mere recovery of damages should not preclude the awarding of 
counsel fees. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 8; accord, Sargeant Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 
(1st Cir. 1978). For critical diSCUSSIOn of the Zarcone case, see Note, The Civil 
Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, 52 ST. JOHN S L. REV 562, 579-83 
(1978). 
133. That the case ultimately may be deCided by JUry should not obscure the 
analYSIS. The question whether pendent Junsdiction eXists IS legal Issue to be de­
Cided, if raised by the defendant, by the Judge at an early stage m the litigation. 
Thus, at the time the Jury returns verdict for the plamtiff, the court will have al­
ready applied the two-pronged test, or if not, the defendant will have waived it. 
Rosado Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Mollan Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 
(1824). 
134. 466 F Supp. at 454. 
135. 562 F.2d at 394. 
136. See generally note 132 supra and accompanymg text. 
137 415 U.S. at 564 (RehnqUlst, J., dissenting). 
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all chums agamst state or local officIals or others actmg under color 
of law 138 
(c) Abstentwn 
Before concluding thIs discussIOn, one other problem should 
be noted. When the state claIm, whIch IS pendent to a federal 
constitutIonal claIm, lOvolves an unsettled or novel questIon, the 
federal court may be reqUIred to abstalO" from decIding it while 
the partIes repaIr to the state court for a definitIve ruling on the 
state law Issue. 139 If the state court deCISIon disposes of the case 
(or even if it does not), the questIon arIses whether the federal 
plamtiff may recover counsel fees for the expense of the legal ser 
VIces rendered m the state proceeding or m the federal proceeding 
prIor to the abstentIon order Although no case has been found 
whICh explicitly addresses thIS POlOt under the 1976 Fees Act, the 
deCISIOn m Chance v. Board of Exammers 140 does, without much 
diSCUSSIOn, examlOe part of the problem. The Chance litIgatIon 
challenged as unconstitutIonal the selectIon procedures for supervI­
sory employees m the New York City school system. The plamtiffs 
138. Although thls diSCUSSIOn has focused on the award of fees m pendent 
claim cases ansmg under § 1983, word should be sald about so-called pendent 
party suits, matter whiCh the Supreme Court has charactenzed as subtle and 
complex question with far-reachmg lmplications. Moor County of Alameda, 411 
U.S. 693, 715 (1973). See generally note 9 and accompanymg text supra. Many of the 
pendent party problems under § 1983, thought to be created by Aldinger Howard, 
427 U.S. 1 (1976), have largely disappeared m the wake of Monell Dep't of Soclal 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). It lS possible, however, that some problems linger m the 
post-Monell world. Assume, for example, that plamtiff asserts § 1983 constitu­
tional clalm agamst one defendant and pendent state or federal clalm agamst both 
defendants. Assume further that the plamtiff prevails on the pendent clalm. May the 
plamtiff now recover counsel fees agamst both defendants? Since the leglslatively 
detennmed rule of declsIOn under the Fees Act lS directed only at claIms, the an­
swer would seem to be yes. See Holley v. Lavme, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979) (in an 
action by an "illegal" alien challengmg the calculation and reduction of welfare ben­
efits, fees were awarded agamst state as well as county officlals based on pendent 
clalm, even though the plamtiff asserted no mdependent basls of Junsdiction agamst 
the state defendant). So long as one clalm ralses constitutional question and the 
other lS non-constitutional m nature, the two-pronged test would apply even though 
the constitutional clalm lS asserted agamst only one defendant. The premlse of the 
Fees Act, as it was of Gibbs, lS that the entire litigation (pendent claims, pendent 
parties, and all) constitutes one constitutional case, and the Fees Act should be 
applied accordingly 
139. Railroad Comm Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The federal plam­
tiff may, of course, reserve the federal questions for later declslOn by the federal 
court after completion of the state proceeding. England Loulslana State Bd. of 
Medical Exammers, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
140. 561 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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prevailed m the early stages of the law suit and received theIr 
counsel fees. The later stages of the litIgatIOn focused on the nature 
and scope of permanent prospectIve relief. UltImately the partIes 
offered the distnct Judge two alternatIve plans for resolvmg the re­
lief questIon and disposmg of the litIgatIon. Neither optIon ratsed 
any federal constitutIonal Issue, but the plan approved by the dis­
tnct court raIsed senous Issues under state law The court of ap­
peals reversed the distnct court Judgment on the ground that the 
resolution of the state law questions should be determmed by the 
state courts. It ordered the distnct Judge not to deCIde the state 
law Issues, remittmg the parties to the state courts to contest any 
permanent plan put mto effect by the defendants. 141 After remand, 
the platntiffs moved for theIr counsel fees under the 1976 Act. The 
distnct court demed an award because the platntiffs did not "pre­
vail" m light of the court of appeals direction to relinqmsh Junsdic­
tIon over that part of the case. 142 
In additIon to the Chance case, closely analogous authority IS 
available. In Brown v. Bathke 143 an unmarned teacher brought 
suit m federal court agamst public school offiCIals for dismIssmg her 
from her Job when she became pregnant. After she prevailed on 
her procedural due process clatm, she moved for an award of attor 
ney fees under the 1976 Act, mcluding the cost of legal aSSIstance 
m proceedings before a state human nghts agency and m the state 
courts. 144 The federal Judge made a partIal award for the cost of le­
gal services at the state level, whICh the court of appeals affirmed 
without much diSCUSSIOn, except to note that a prevailing plamtiff 
under the 1976 Act may recover counsel fees for servIces prOVided 
"in other related proceedings. "145 
Similarly m Carey v New York Gaslight Club Inc. 146 the 
plamtiff filed a complamt with the United States Equal Employ­
ment Opportunity CommISSIon (EEOC) under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, allegmg raCIal discnmmatIon m the refusal 
of the defendant to hue her as a waitress. Under the federal stat­
ute, the EEOC IS reqmred to refer the complamt to the state Civil 
141. Id. 
142. 472 F Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
143. 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978). 
144. It is unclear from the opmlOn how the state proceedings began. The plam­
tiff may have filed discnmmation complamt with the state human nghts agency, or 
she may have filed one with the federal agency, which m turn deferred to the state 
forum. 
145. 588 F.2d at 638. 
146. 598 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 204 (1979). 
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nghts agency if it provIdes comparable remedies as the federal law 
In thIS case, the EEOC referred Ms. Carey s complamt to the ap­
propnate New York agency whIch eventually found discnmmatIon. 
Shortly before the New York appellate court affirmed the agency 
order 147 the plamtiff filed suit m the federal court seekmg an 
award of attorney fees mcurred before the state agency The dis­
tnct Judge demed the application, whiCh the court of appeals re­
versed. It held that the attorney fees prOVlSlon m title VII, whIch 
applies to any actIOn or proceeding under the statute, authonzes 
an award for the legal servIces rendered before the state agency to 
whiCh the plamtiff was reqmred to go under the law 148 The key 
statutory words or proceeding," upon whiCh the court of appeals 
m Carey relied, are also found m the 1976 Fees Act, whIch em­
ploys the same phrase, any actIon or proceeding. "149 
In contrast, a distnct Judge has refused to award counsel fees 
for legal servIces rendered m related state proceedings. In 
Burchett v. Bower 150 the plamtiff commenced an action m federal 
court to restram state offiCIals from transfernng hIm back to pnson 
from a state mental health hospital where he had been sent for 
treatment. The plamtiff claImed that the defendants should not af­
fect the transfer without gIvmg hIm a hearmg on the question 
whether the medical treatment has been completed. The distnct 
Judge awarded the plaIntiff counsel fees under the 1976 Act for 
prevailing on hIS section 1983 claIm m the federal court. The 
Judge, however refused to make any award for the related state 
proceedings on the ground that he had no way of evaluatmg the le­
gal servIces rendered m the other forum. 
While title VII reqmred the plamtiff m Carey to proceed 
through the state agency it IS not clear from the declSlons m 
Brown and Burchett why those plamtiffs made appearances m state 
forums. In any event, the results m Brown and Carey rest on a 
firmer footmg than the deCISIOn m Burchett and should be applied 
to fee claIms under the 1976 Act by federal plamtiffs who are re­
qmred by the abstention doctnne to litigate at least part of theIr 
lawsuit m state court. There IS no pnncipled difference, for attor 
ney fee purposes, between the plaIntiff who IS compelled to seek a 
147. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. New York State Human Rights Appeal 
Bd., 59 App. Div 2d 852, 399 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1977), leave to appeal denied, 43 N.Y.2d 
648,403 N.Y.S.2d 1026,374 N.E.2d 630 (1978). 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). 
149. Id. § 1988. 
150. 470 F Supp. 1170 (D. Anz. 1979). 
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state remedy because of a statutory reqUlrement, as m Carey and 
the plamtiff who must do so because of a JudicIally-created rule, as 
m abstention cases. Allowmg recovery for the cost of the state pro­
ceeding, especIally if it disposes of the litigation, IS based on the 
same conSIderations whICh moved Congress to permit fees under 
the 1976 Act on a pendent state claIm actually litigated m the fed­
eral court. The congressIOnal Judgment seeks to accommodate the 
JudicIally-created rule requmng the resolution of cases on non­
constitutional grounds whenever possible to aVOid deCIding consti­
tutional questIons. 151 Applymg that determmatIon to the Judicially­
created doctnne of abstention serves precIsely the same values 
whICh Congress expressly recogmzed m the Fees Act. 
The rule m Burchett refusmg to award fees because the fed­
eral Judge cannot evaluate the serVIces rendered m the state tribu­
nal, IS unsupportable. Apart from those cases where the Judge does 
precIsely that for legal serVIces provIded before federal admimstra­
tIve agencIes,152 the distnct Judge operates under a sImilar disabil­
ity m evaluatmg fee claims for pre-tnal work, most of WhICh IS per 
formed without the presence of the Judge. Yet it would hardly be 
an appropnate rule to limit attorney fees to "in-court" legal aSSIS­
tance. Here, as elsewhere, the Judge must rely on sworn testimony 
scrutImzed with care by the opposmg counsel through the normal 
operatIOn of the adversary system. 
Finally m abstention cases, where the state court declSlon re­
solves the dispute, the appropnate procedure for recovermg coun­
sel fees would be for the plamtiff to ask the federal court, as the 
plaintiff did m Carey to make the award. Of course, the plamtiff al­
ways has the option under the abstention doctnne to submit the 
entire case, mcluding the federal claims, to the state court for final 
adjudicatIon. 153 Since the 1976 Act authonzes the state court to 
award attorney fees,l54 a prevailing plamtiff would petition the 
state Judge to make the award. If the state Judgment rests on a 
state ground, then the state court would apply the two-pronged 
test of substantiality and common nucleus adopted by the Con­
gress for such purposes. 155 
151. See text accompanymg notes 114-38 supra. 
152. E.g., Fischer v. Adams, 572 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1978); Parker v. Califano. 
561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
153. England Medical Exammers, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
154. See text accompanymg notes 187-89 mfra. 
155. See text accompanymg notes 190-208 mfra. 
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3. Cases Misapplymg the Rule 
A thIrd line of declSlons m multI-claim cases mvolvmg constI­
tutIonal Issues embraces those where the courts unnecessarily ap­
plied the two-pronged test to determme fee awards. The first case 
was Southeast Legal Defense Group v Adams156 where the plam­
tiff sued to enJom state and federal officIals from locatmg a hIgh­
way Mt. Hood Freeway through Portland, Oregon. They asserted 
twelve claIms based on SIX federal statutes, mcluding sectIon 1983, 
and the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The court prelimmarily 
enJomed the defendants from building the hIghway because they 
had failed to comply with the Federal AId Highway Act whICh re­
qmred a heanng before determmmg hIghway locatIon. Although 
the defendants abandoned the proJect, they appealed the distnct 
court Judgment. The court of appeals dismIssed the appeal as 
moot. 157 The distnct court then dismIssed the remamder of the 
plamtiffs claIms as moot, and demed theIr request for counsel fees. 
The plamtiffs noted theIr appeal from the demal of fees, and, 
dunng its pendency Congress enacted the 1976 Fees Act. The 
court of appeals then remanded the case for reconsIderatIon of the 
counsel fee request m light of the new Act. 158 On remand, the dis­
tnct court applied the two-pronged test m footnote 7 of the House 
Report to reach the proper result. 159 Finding the reqUIsite sub­
stantIality and common nucleus of operatIve fact, the distnct 
Judge awarded counsel fees to the plamtiffs. It was, however, un­
necessary to mvoke those standards because the federal statutory 
claim, upon whICh the court entered a prelimmary mJunctIon, IS 
embraced by sectIon 1983, a statute covered by the Fees Awards 
Act.160 It must be recalled that, under the Act, the two-pronged 
156. 436 F Supp. 891 (D. Or. 1977). 
157. Unreported order of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dated September 13, 
1976. 436 F Supp. at 894. 
158. Id. 
159. The court rejected the fee claim agamst the federal defendants because 
the Fees Act does not specifically provide for recovery agamst the United States as 
reqUired. Id. at 893 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976)). 
160. The distnct court' analysIs IS somewhat confusmg because, havmg ap­
plied the two-pronged test m order to assert Junsdiction over the pendent statutory 
claims, it then noted that it was not necessary to deCide whether § 1983 extends to 
vIOlations of federal statutes. Id. at 894 n.6. That reasomng IS flawed because the 
plamtiff' nght of action, as distingUished from the Junsdiction of the federal court to 
hear it, must denve from some source. It must come either from the statute itself as 
an express or Implied claim for relief or from § 1983. See note 113 supra. If the dis­
met court did Imply nght of action under the Federal Aid Highway Act, then that 
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test IS to be applied only when the non-constitutIOnal claim IS not 
covered by the statute. 
Similarly the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir­
cuit unnecessarily applied the two-pronged analysIs ill Lund v. Af­
fleck,161 whICh mvolved three cases consolidated for purposes of 
determmmg whether counsel fees should be awarded. In one suit, 
unwed mothers challenged a state welfare regulation whICh dented 
benefits if a man lived m the house, whether or not he furntshed 
any monetary support for the family In the second case, a mmor 
pregnant female challenged a state welfare regulatIOn whICh pro­
VIded hIgher benefits for adult pregnant women. The plamtiff m 
the thIrd case sued to enforce an earlier consent decree whICh pro­
VIded for the proper care and treatment of mcarcerated Juveniles. 
In all three cases, the plamtiffs mstituted the litigatIOn under sec­
tIon 1983, allegmg constitutional and statutory VIOlations, and all 
were concluded on non-constitutional grounds. 
The distnct court applied the two-pronged test to determme 
whether fees should be awarded, notmg that it had already applied 
that test m at least one of the consolidated cases to determme JU­
nsdictIon at an earlier stage of the litIgatIon. As m the Adams case, 
however, it was unnecessary to apply the two-pronged standard for 
attorney fee purposes because the non-constitutIonal claIms, upon 
whIch the Judgments on the merits rested, were withm the scope 
of section 1983. 162 The distnct court did not fully apprecIate that 
the Gibbs-Hagans critena adopted by Congress IS to be applied 
only when the non-constitutional claIm IS not covered by the Fees 
Act. 163 In a short, uncritical opmlOn, the court of appeals affirmed 
the Judgment and approved the analYSIS of the distnct Judge. 
The distnct court m Affleck applied the two-pronged test ap­
parently because it read footnote 7 m the House Report as castmg 
"some doubt" on the VieW that section 1983 provIdes a remedy for 
federal statutory claIms. 164 If the footnote IS read m IsolatIon from 
c1a1m would be non-fee cla1m, making appropnate the application of the two­
pronged test. But the oplnlOn 1S not clear. Perhaps the court' failure to separate JU­
nsdictional 1ssues from nghts of action lead it to m1sapply the two-pronged standard 
for awarding attorney fees. For slmilar error In analys1s, see White Beal, 447 F 
Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
161. 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978). 
162. In fauness to the distnct court, it appears that the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals has never expressly held that § 1983 mcludes all or most federal statutory 
c1a1ms, although it has made that assumption on numerous occaSlOns. E.g., Randall 
Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356 (1st Cir. 1974). 
163. 415 U.S. at 528; 383 U.S. at 715. 
164. 442 F Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.R.1. 1977). 
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the rest of the legIslative hIstory and if the citation to Gibbs IS Ig­
nored, it IS possible to reach that conclusIOn. As noted above, how­
ever, the legIslative hIStOry IS crystal clear that Congress was fully 
aware that "Section 1983 authonzes suits agamst State and local 
officIals based upon Federal statutory as well as constitutional 
nghts."165 Had the distnct Judge and the court of appeals m 
Affleck exammed the legIslative hIstory of the Act more carefully 
they mIght well have concluded that Congress mtended the courts 
to gIVe an expanSIve reading of [section] 1983 and the Fees 
Act."166 
Although the courts m Adams and Affleck Improperly applied 
the two-pronged test to non-constitutIonal clatms under section 
1983 for attorney fee purposes, there are some mstances when 
such post-Judgment evaluation IS arguably appropnate. The most 
obVIOUS CIrcumstance IS when the distnct Judge (or on occaSIOn, an 
appellate court) has not, either expressly or Impliedly applied the 
Gibbs-Hagans pendent JunsdictIon doctnne because the case con­
cluded at an early stage of the litIgation. The legIslative hIstory of 
the 1976 Act IS clear that attorney fees may be awarded if a case 
brought under a covered statute termmates m the plamtiffs favor 
pnor to the entry of an order after a full eVIdentiary heanng. 167 
Cases settled by consent decree, for example, are eligible for coun­
sel fees. 16S When multI-claIm litigatIon under section 1983 mvolv­
mg constitutional and non-constitutIOnal clatms termmates by con­
sent Judgment, the court, upon plamtiff's motIon for counsel fees, 
must determme whether JunsdictIon eXIsts over the actIOn pnor 
to the award of fees. In such mstances, the court IS applymg the 
two-pronged test for Junsdichonal purposes as a prereqmsite to 
awarding attorney fees to the platntiff. Thus, it may frurly be saId 
that, under these speCIal CIrcumstances, the court should apply the 
165. 122 CONGo REC. 35122 (1976); see Id. at 33312-14. 
166. 442 F Supp. at 1114. The courts have held that the Fees Act should be 
liberally construed. 562 F.2d at 393; Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. G & U, Inc., 
578 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1978). "The Act itself could not be broader. 437 U.S. at 
694. 
167 H.R. REP supra note 5, at 7; S. REP supra note 105, at 5, repnnted In 
[1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912-13. 
168. Even if the plamtiff does not obtam formal decree and even if formal 
Judgment of dismissal IS entered for the defendant, the plaintiff may nonetheless be 
entitled to fees if the lawsuit acted as catalyst" for changing the defendant' prac­
tices. E.g., Ross Horn, 598 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1979). Cj Tobeluk Lind, 589 P 
2d 873 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1979) (plaintiffs could not recover their fees because, the 
court found, their suit was not the catalyst for the defendant' remedial action). 
232 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:193 
test at the time of awarding fees even though the non-constitutional 
clrums are clearly withm the scope of sectIOn 1983. 
Gagne v. Maher 169 fully illustrates the pomt. In that case, a 
class of welfare recIpIents challenged the method of calculatmg aId 
to families with dependent children whICh was employed by the 
defendant officials. The plamtiffs attacked the methodology on con­
stitutIOnal (equal protectIOn and due process) and statutory (SocIal 
Security Act) grounds. Before tnal, the parties entered mto a con­
sent decree. Upon applicatIon for fees, the distnct Judge applied 
the two-pronged analYSIS m disposmg of the counsel fee Issue. The 
court of appeals affirmed the fees award, approvmg the distnct 
court's applicatIOn of the Gibbs-Hagans standards for pendent Juns­
dictIon. Although the court erroneously described the statutory 
nght of actIon as a non-fee clrum, it did appropnately mqmre 
mto the JunsdictIonal prereqmsite for the lawsuit, thus provIding a 
baSIS upon whIch to award fees m settled cases. 170 
4. ExhaustIon of Remedies 
Although the Supreme Court has not reqmred plamtiffs who 
assert constitutIonal claIms through sectIon 1983 to exhaust theIr 
state admIlllstratIveI71 or JudicIal172 remedies before mvokmg the 
169. Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 
(1979); see White v. Beal, 447 F Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
170. In White, the plaintiffs sued state welfare officials for refusmg to reim­
burse the cost of eyeglasses. They alleged VIOlations of the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and of the Social Security Act, 
basmg theIr claims on § 1983. In an earlier Judgment, the distnct court enJomed the 
defendants from continumg to deny payments as VIOlation of the Social Security 
Act. White V Beal, 413 F Supp. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 
1977). Upon plamtiffs motion for theIr counsel fees, the tnal Judge referred to the 
statutory VIOlation as non-fee claim even though it was brought mto the suit 
through § 1983, statute covered by the Fees Act. Unlike Gagne, however, it was 
unnecessary m White to apply the two-pronged test for fee purposes because the 
plamtiff prevailed on claim covered by the statute after full adjudication. But see 
Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 559 F.2d 270, 273 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977) (1976 Fees 
Act not applicable if consent decree based only on federal statutory claim for 
whICh court Implied nght of action) (dictum). Cf Barrett Kalinowski, 458 F 
Supp. 689 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (prelimmary consent decree based In part on state law 
over whICh the Judge ultimately declined JUrisdiction; In detenmmng whether the 
plamtiff IS prevailing party under the 1976 Act, the court cannot conSider the 
pendent state claims) (dictum). 
171. McNeese Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). 
172. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Although plamtiff asserting con­
stitutional claim through § 1983 against state offiCials need not exhaust state JudiCial 
remedies, the federal distnct court may be reqUired to apply the abstention doctnne. 
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JunsdictIon of the federal court, it has not yet addressed that ques­
tIon with regard to federal statutory claIms asserted through sectIon 
1983. Indeed, as noted earlier the Court IS yet to hold that sectIon 
1983 provIdes a remedy for all statutorily created claIms.173 In a 
recent distnct court OpInIOn, the Judge did reqUIre the plaIntiff to 
exhaust state admInIstratIve remedies In that context. In Harns v. 
Campbell,174 an emotIonally disturbed child, through hIs mother, 
brought suit agaInst state and local officIals for failing to provIde 
hIm with an equal educatIonal opportunity The plaIntiff alleged VI­
olatIons of the federal EducatIon for All Handicapped Children Act 
of 1975,175 the RehabilitatIon Act of 1973,176 the equal protectIon 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, sectIon 1983, and varIOUS pro­
VISIOns of state law The distnct court held that the plaIntiff must 
first exhaust hIs state admInIstratIve remedies under the Handi­
capped Children Act before bnngIng suit In federal court. The 
Judge further held that the other federal claIms are premature and 
that the dismIssal of the federal claIms precluded the exerCIse of 
pendent JunsdictIOn over the state claIms. The Issue of attorney 
fees under the 1976 Act was not discussed. 
As m the abstentIon area, no case has been located whICh dis­
cusses the applicatIon of the 1976 Fees Act to cases where exhaus­
tIon of state remedies IS reqUIred. Similarly as In the abstentIon 
area, closely analogous authority under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 IS available. ExamInatIon of the leading case, Carey v. 
CJ
New York Gaslight Club Inc. 177 will not be repeated here as it 
was adequately discussed In the preceding sectIon. Suffice it to say 
here that fees under the 1976 Act should be available when the 
federal plaIntiff IS reqUIred to exhaust her state or local admInIstra­
tIve remedies as a prereqUIsite to brIngmg an actIOn In federal 
court. The reasons whICh support that conclUSIOn under title VII, 
as Interpreted In Carey and whIch were discussed In connectIon 
with abstentIon, are equally applicable here. The legIslatIve hIStOry 
Hamson v. NAACP 360 U.S. 167 (1959); see notes 139-55 supra. The Court has not 
addressed the exhaustion Issue In the context of the other statutes covered by the 
1976 Fees Act, except to note In dictum that exhaustion of federal administrative 
remedies IS not reqUired In suits brought under Title IX of the Education Amend­
ments of 1972. Cannon Umversity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-07 n.41 (1979). 
173. See text accompanying notes 100-02 supra. 
174. 472 F Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
175. Id. at 52. 
176. Id.at55. 
177 598 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 204 (1979). 
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states,178 and the courts have affirmed,179 the VIew that the 1976 
Act should be construed as title VII has been mterpreted. Indeed, 
the key language of the 1976 Act IS IdentIcal to the relevant words 
of title VII. In such cases, the courts should follow the Carey case 
m claIms ansmg under the 1976 Act where the plamtiff IS reqUIred 
to exhaust her admInIstratIve remedies. Consequently if a plamtiff, 
m that CIrcumstance, prevails before the state or local admmistra­
tIve agency or failing there, prevails upon returnmg to the federal 
court, attorney fees should be awarded for the expenses mcurred 
before the state or local agency 
VI. MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION IN STATE COURT 
A. Background 
It IS mstructIve to revIew a selectIon of the state court cases 
apart from the federal court cases for several reasons. It under 
scores that the assertIon of federal nghts m state court IS still, as it 
was m the begmnmg, a very vIable alternatIve to the federal fo­
rum. Recent scholarly literature has reflected the mcreasmg use 
of the state courts to litigate federal nghts, both constitutIOnal and 
statutory 180 So-called public mterest" litigants espeCIally have be­
gun to rethmk theIr refleXIve VIew that the vmdicatIon of federal 
nghts IS best suited to a federal forum. 181 The recent senes of 
door-closmg" declSlons by the Supreme Court has accelerated the 
trend away from the federal courts toward the state courtS. 182 His­
178. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 6-8; S. REP supra note 105, at 4-6, repnnted 
III [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5911-13. 
179. See, e.g., Brown Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1978); King v. 
Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). 
180. E.g., Stafford Muster, 582 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1979); Kurtz City 
of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 280 N.W.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1979); see generally Redish 
& Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action III State Court, 75 MICH. L. 
REv 311 (1976); Note, Of Laboratones and Liberties: State Court Protection of Po­
litical and Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REV 533 (1976). ThiS shift away from the federal 
courts toward the state courts should please those writers who have severely criti­
Cized the scope of Gibbs. See, e.g., Shakman, supra note 71, Note, The Concept of 
Law-Tied Pendent JUrisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger ReconSIdered, 87 YALE L.J. 
627 (1978). 
181. See generally Brown, Public Interest Litigation In the States-A Foster 
Home for Federal Orphans? 12 SUFFOLK L. REV 1184 (1978); Comment, Protecting 
Fundamental Rights III State Courts: Fitting State Peg to Federal Hole, 12 
HARV C.R.-C.L.L. REV 63 (1977). 
182. E.g., Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing); Younger Hams, 
401 U.S. 37 (1971) (equitable restramt); Snyder Hams, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (Juns­
dictional amount). See generally notes 180 & 181 supra. 
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toncally the state courts were perceIved m fact and m theory as 
the pnmary protectors of federal nghts,183 partly because of theIr 
mdependent source of power and partly because the federal courts 
had, m our early hIstOry very limited JunsdictIon over federal ques­
tIOns. Also, the applicatIon of the Fees Act m state courts add a 
few extra wnnkles whIch Justifies separate treatment. 
It should be noted mitIally that state courts have concurrent 
JunsdictIOn with federal courts over federal claIms. 184 The plamtiff 
who believes her federal statutory or constitutIonal nghts have 
been VIOlated may mstitute an actIon either m state or federal 
court, unless Congress otherwIse proVIdes by gIVmg either tnal 
court exclUSIve JunsdictIon. 18s Apart from the optIon of the plamtiff 
to utilize the state forum, the Supreme Court has held that the 
state courts are obligated under the Supremacy Clause to entertam 
federal claIms, at least when the state courts entertaIn snnilar suits 
under state law 186 
The essentIal difference between multI-clatm litIgatIon m the 
183. "In the scheme of the Constitution, [the state courts] are the pnmary guar­
antors of constitutional nghts, and m many cases they may be the ultimate ones. 
Hart, The Power of Congress to Ltmit the JUrisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exer­
cise In Dialectic, 66 HARV L. REv 1362, 1401 (1953). 
184. "Concurrent Junsdiction has been common phenomenon m our Judiclal 
hlstory, and excluslve federal court Junsdiction over cases ansmg under federal law 
has been the exception rather than the rule. Charles Dowd Box Co. v Courtney 
368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962) (footnote omitted); accord Chaflin Houseman, 93 U.S. 
130 (1876); Williams Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 548 P.2d 1125, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453 
(1976); Board of Trustees Holso, 584 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1978). See generally 
THE FEDERALIST, No. 82. 
185. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976) (bankruptcy Junsdiction excluslve m 
federal courts) with Id. § 1331(a) (1976) (federal question Junsdiction for cases 
mvolvmg less than $10,000 excluslve m state courts). See generally HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 53 at 418-38. 
186. Testa Katt, 330 U.S. at 386. In an earlier case, the Court pennitted 
New York court to decline the exerClse of Junsdiction over clalm under the Federal 
Employers Llability Act for an otherwlse valid excuse. Douglas New York, 
N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929). In Douglas, state statute allowed non­
resldents to sue forelgn compames only m certam cases, among whICh Douglas com­
plamt did not number. Relymg on Douglas, Flonda appellate court recently af­
finned the dismlssal of clalm based on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
(forblds discnmmation agamst handicapped persons m federally asslsted programs), 
m part, because it believed the Flonda courts lacked sufficlent power to provlde the 
plamtiff with an adequate remedy It held that no Flonda court can undertake re­
sponsibility for federal statute without concern for its own power to effectuate 
Judgment. Zonck Tynes, 372 So.2d 133, 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Al­
though the plamtiff m ZOrlck prevailed on state law ground, he was unable to ob­
tam attorney fees because of the dismlssal of the § 504 clalm, whICh could have pro­
vlded basls for counsel fees through § 1983. 
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state courts and m the federal courts IS that the state courts do not 
need to rely on concepts such as pendent junsdictIon m order to 
adjudicate all the claIms m the case. Since every state has tnal 
courts of general junsdictIon, unlike the federal courts whICh have 
limited junsdictIon, the plamtiff may plead every available claIm m 
the state court without fear of dismIssal because the court lacks JU­
nsdictIon, or because the state law clrums are more appropnately 
litIgated m the state forum. Of course, state Jomder rules are fully 
applicable and the multI-claIm plamtiff must comply with them. 
But other than those rather narrow limitatIons, the state court 
plamtiff has, it may fairly be saId, almost no difficulty assertmg all 
available claIms agamst the defendant. 
Because state courts have concurrent JunsdictIon over federal 
claims, it follows that they also have the power to apply all federal 
remedial statutes whIch may asSISt the state court m grantmg full 
relief. 187 It appears that all state courts award costs to the prevail­
mg party at the conclusIOn of the law suit, and under the 1976 
Fees Act, attorney fees are deemed to be a part of the costs. "188 
Also, Congress mtended the state courts to apply the Fees Act m 
cases properly brought before them. RepresentatIve Drman, the 
floor manager m the House, stated: "ThIS bill would authonze 
State and Federal Courts to award counsel fees m actIons brought 
under specified sectIons of the United States Code relatmg to CIvil 
and constitutIonal nghts. "189 
B. The New York Cases 
Most of the reported cases applymg the 1976 Fees Act m state 
court have arIsen m New York. There are only a relatIvely few 
cases m other JUrIsdictIons. 19o Thus, for illustratIve purposes, we 
187. E.g., Sullivan Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). T the ex­
tent that state court must, under Testa or other constitutional or statutory compul­
SiOn, entertam federal claim, the state court must proVide all remedies authOrized 
by Congress, mcluding attorney fees. 330 U.S. at 386; see generally Note, The 
Enforceability and Proper Implementation of § 1983 and the Attorney Fees 
Awards Act m State Courts, 20 ARIZ. L. REV 743 (1978). 
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). Thus, at minimUm, if state court allows costs 
to prevailing party for claim based on state law then it must, under Testa, award 
counsel fees as part of the costs to party who prevails on claims to whICh the 1976 
Fees Act extends. 330 U.S. at 386. 
189. 122 CONGo REC. 35122 (1976). 
190. E.g., Fairbanks Correctional Center Inmates Williamson, 600 P.2d 743 
(Alaska 1979); Thorpe Durango School Dist. No. 9-R, 591 P.2d 1329 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1978), cert. granted, No. 78-068 (Colo. Sup. Ct. March 19, 1979); Board of Trus­
tees V. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
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will focus on the New York decIsIOns. In Young v TOta,191 the 
plamtiff sought a declaratIOn of unconstitutIonality and an mJunc­
tIon agamst the enforcement of a provIsIon m the state SOCIal ser 
VIces act known as the work rule. That prOVISIOn reqUIred reCIpI­
ents of public assIstance to work a prescribed number of days per 
week. The Impact of the law was to cause recIpIents to work for 
pay far below the mmimum wage. The plamtiff challenged the 
work rule on the basIs of state and federal law mcluding consti­
tutIonal grounds. The tnal court mvalidated the prOVlSlon based on 
two prOVISIOns of the state constitutIon. It demed attorney fees un­
der the 1976 Act on the ground that the Act does not apply to state 
courts. 192 
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate DivlSlon, Fourth 
Department, reversed the demal of counsel fees and remanded for 
an evaluation of the amount due. First, it held, referrmg to Repre­
sentatIve Drman s floor statement, that the Fees Act does apply to 
state court proceedings. Then, it rejected the contentIOn that the 
Act should be declared mapplicable because the tnal Judge decIded 
the case on state law grounds. The court noted that sectIon 1983, 
m the context of thIs case, grants substantially the same nghts as 
the state constitutional proVIsIOns relied on by the tnal court. 193 
Without further diSCUSSIOn, the court reversed the lower court Judg­
ment and remanded the case for a determmatIOn of the amount of 
counsel fees. 
While the court m Young reached the correct result, its rea­
sonmg Ignored the proper mterpretatIon of the statute announced 
m the Seals case. Seals, followmg the footnote m the House Re­
port, held that courts must apply the pendent JunsdictIon test m 
order to award counsel fees when the deCISIOn rests on a clatm not 
covered by the Act and one of the claIms m the case IS a federal 
constitutIonal question asserted pursuant to sectIon 1983. By citmg 
Seals, the appellate divlSlon apparently recogmzed the appropnate 
test for the application of the Fees Act. For some unexplamed rea­
son, however, it then failed to apply the test to the facts and clatms 
m the case before it so as to produce a sound result. 194 
191. 66 App. Div 2d 377, 413 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1979). 
192. ld. at 378,413 N.Y.S.2d at 531. 
193. ld. at 380, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 532. 
194. On the same day as Young was deCIded, the appellate diVISIOn also an­
nounced its deCISIon m Ashley Curtis, 67 App. Div 2d 828, 413 N.Y.S.2d 528 
(1979), where plamtiff, pursuant to Article 78 and § 1983, successfully prevented ter­
mmation of her welfare benefits by state and local offiCIals. The appellate diVISIOn 
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In sharp contrast, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
DIvlSlon, Second Department, accurately stated the appropnate 
test for awarding fees but reached the wrong result m Bess v. 
TOW. 195 In that case, Mrs. Bess son was shot and killed. Because 
she did not have adequate additional funds to pay for the funeral 
expenses, she used her monthly rent and food allowance provIded 
under state law to pay the undertaker When she applied to the so­
CIal servIces agency for an emergency grant of rent and food money 
for herself and her survlVmg children, the agency demed Mrs. 
Bess request. It then granted her a $275 rent advance upon her 
sIgnmg a recoupment agreement provIding for repayment of that 
advance m equal mstallments over the next SIX months, to be de­
ducted from her regular monthly subsIstence grants. 196 
Pursuant to article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and 
Rules (CPLR), the plamtiff challenged the demal of bunal aSSIS­
tance and the recoupment provlSlon as vIOlatmg state and federal 
law mcluding the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend­
ment. 197 The court found that the defendant local department of 
SOCIal serVIces mamtamed a policy of denymg any bunal aSSIstance 
where the cost of the funeral exceeded $650. If the cost was less 
than that amount, the department would reImburse the reCIpIent 
for the full cost of the funeral. The tnal Judge held that thIS policy 
VIOlated a prOVlSlon of the state SOCIal ServIces Law and demes 
equal treatment to welfare reCIpIents who cannot bury theIr dead 
"198 He added: "The distinction made and the divlSlon created 
among welfare reCIpIents of equal need IS a most mSIdious type of 
mVIdious discnmmation. "199 Because the court ordered the local 
defendants to pay the plamtiff $650, it did not address the attack 
on the validity of the recoupment prOVlSlon. It also demed the 
plamtiff's request for attorney fees without any diSCUSSIOn. 
On appeal, the appellate divlSlon held that the 1976 Fees Act 
reversed the demal of fees as to the § 1983 relief obtamed agamst the local offiCials, 
but affinned it as to the state offiCials because the relief rested on state law By 
Ignonng the congressIOnally-established rule of deCISIOn regarding such claims, the 
appellate court failed to apply the appropnate analYSIS, and thus reached the wrong 
result. For an even more mscrutable deCISIOn denymg fees m Similar SOCial secu­
rity benefits case, see Gayton v. Shang, 97 Misc. 2d 780, 400 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. 
1978). 
195. 66 App. Div 2d 844, 411 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1978). 
196. 93 Misc. 2d 140, 141,402 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
197. [d. 
198. 93 Misc. 2d at 142,402 N.Y.S.2d at 708. 
199. [d. at 144,402 N.Y.S.2d at 709. 
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IS fully applicable m state courts, even absent any express state au­
thorIzatIon. It then held that the case does not mvolve any "bona 
fide sectIon 1983 claIm because it IS sImply an artIcle 78 proceed­
mg of the CPLR. 200 With regard to the trIal court's discussIOn of 
the equal protectIon claIm, the appellate court held that it was 
wholly unnecessary to the result and IS of dubIOUS constitutional 
validity "201 Recogmzmg the availability of the pendent JUrIsdictIon 
test for fees as announced m Seals and Kimbrough, the court stated 
that the facts alleged by Mrs. Bess do not raIse a substantial" con­
stitutIonal clalm. 202 Alternatively the court held that fees under 
the 1976 Act may be awarded m the discretion of the trIal Judge 
and the plamtiff did not show any abuse of that discretIon. 203 
The appellate divlSlon, while recogmzmg the applicable legal 
prInCIples under the 1976 Act for awarding fees when the case IS 
disposed of on a non-fee claIm, nonetheless mIsapplied the settled 
test. By reqmrmg the plamtiff to show that its constitutIOnal claIm 
under sectIon 1983 was substantIal," the court Ignored the holding 
of the United States Supreme Court m Hagans 204 the case to 
whICh the legIslatIve hIstory of the Fees Act expressly refers. 205 In 
Hagans, while acknowledgmg that federal JUrIsdictIon attaches only 
to substantial" federal questions, the Court adopted a much more 
mmlmal test of substantIality than mIght have appeared from 
some of its older declSlons. 206 The federal court IS without JUrIsdic­
tion only if the claIm IS "wholly msubstantIal, obVIOusly fnvo­
lous," or "absolutely deVOId of merit. "207 The court makes that de­
termmatIon by lookmg solely to the plamtiff's complamt, not to any 
later developments m the case. 208 ThIS mmimal test of federal 
200. 66 App. Div 2d at 844-45,411 N.Y.S.2d at 653. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. ThiS alternative ground appears Inconsistent with the congresslOnally­
approved standard that prevailing plaIntiff should ordinarily recover an attorney 
fee unless speCial Circumstances would render such an award unjust. Newman 
Piggle Park Enterpnses, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); S. REP supra note 105, at 
4, repnnted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5911. 12; H.R. REP 
supra note 5, at 6. 
204. 415 U.S. 528 (1974). 
205. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 4 n.7. 
206. See note 77 supra. 
207. 415 U.S. at 536-37 (citations omitted) (quoting from earlier Supreme Court 
cases). In dissent, Justice RehnqUist protested that the new formulation allowed JU­
risdiction so long as the plaIntiff "is able to plead hiS claim with straight face. ld. 
at 564. 
208. See note 76 supra. 
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court JUrIsdictIon IS the one adopted by the Congress to resolve the 
attorney fee Issue m multi-claim litIgatIon mvolvmg constitutional 
Issues when the deCISIon rests on a non-fee claim. The appellate di­
VISIOn misapplied that rule m the Bess case. 
Although the reported state deCISIons constitute a relative 
handful when compared to the federal cases, we should expect 
that, as public mterest litIgants mcreasmgly use the state forums, 
more cases will be deCided there under the Fees Act. In such m­
stances, the plamtiffs must be careful to present their fee claims m 
precise and careful terms so that the state Judges are absolutely 
certam about their authority to award fees and the proper test to 
be applied. Nothmg can replace careful analYSIS, however and the 
deCISIons m New York illustrate the ease with whICh courts can 
commit error m applymg a statute with comprehenSive and ex­
plicit legislative history "209 
VII. POTENTIAL SCOPE OF THE RULE 
It IS clear that, based on the legislatIve history of the 1976 
Fees Act, the reach of the statute IS potentIally very broad. The 
most expansive use of the Act IS arguably m multI-clrum litigation 
mvolvmg non-federal governmental offiCials or others acting under 
color of state law CreatIve pleading by plamtiffs could very well 
sweep withm the scope of the Act cases whICh might not, at first 
blush, be covered by the statute. 
A. Non-Constitutwnal Federal Statutory Clatn/,s 
One of the most obvIOUS avenues for an expansive application 
of the Fees Act IS through the use of sectIon 1983. Unless the Su­
preme Court overrules or modifies the unammous view of the 
courts of appeals, plamtiffs may brmg all federal statutory claims 
agamst persons actmg under color of law through the remedial de­
vice of section 1983. Although thiS artIcle does not address smgle 
claim litIgatIon, it IS clear that statutory claims alone may be mstI­
tuted under section 1983. If there should be a JUrIsdictIOnal prob­
lem m the federal courts,210 then the plamtiff may litIgate m the 
209. See note 126 supra at 269. 
210. E.g., Chapman Houston Welfare Rights Orgamzation, 441 U.S. 600 
(1979). Even if § 1983 IS construed to cover all federal statutory clrums, the question 
of JUrIsdiction still remams. The Chapman case cuts off the use of § 1343 to secure 
JUrIsdiction over § 1983 statutory-based claIms unless the underlymg statute IS one 
prOVIding for equal rIghts or for the protection of CIvil rIghts. 28 U.S.C. § 
1343(3), (4) (1976). After Chapman, many statutory claIms will not fit the Court' re­
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state courts. 
There IS a wIde range of cIvil rIghts prOVISIons m federal stat­
utes whICh could provIde a baSIS for many suits agamst non-federal 
governmental offiCIals. The United States Code contams apprOXI­
mately eIghty anbdiscrImmabon provlSlons, whIch cover a WIde 
range of actIvitIes. 211 While they vary m the groups to whom pro­
tectIon IS gIven, most are directed at reCIpients of federal funds. 
Such statutory prOVlSlons could prOVIde the baSIS for suits agamst 
public offiCIals and entibes through section 1983 to achIeve compli­
ance with the statutory proscrIptIons. 212 In additIOn many federal 
statutes whICh prOVIde funds for a WIde varIety of purposes create 
rIghts for benefiCIarIes who do not fall withm traditIonally pro­
tected categorIes such as race, color, religlOn, sex, or national OrI­
gm. 213 If these clrums are enforced through the remedial deVIce of 
sectIon 1983, attorney fees would be available under the 1976 Act. 
When the whole range of federal statutory rIghts IS exammed for 
the prIvate claIms that may be available through sectIon 1983, the 
litIgatIon potentIal and the concomitant coverage of the Fees Act 
are enormous. 
B. Non-Constitutwnal State Clatms 
The second major area of potentIally expanSIve use of the Fees 
Act IS m multI-claIm litIgatIon when the state claIms are Jomed 
with federal constitutIonal clrums, either m state or III federal 
strIctive definition. Consequently alternative bases of JUrIsdiction will have to be 
found if the plamtiff deslIes to litigate her clalms m federal court. Without ex­
tended discusslOn, there are at least two JUrIsdictional possibilities: (1) pendent JUrIS­
diction under § 1343 (assummg the plamtiff IS already asserting constitutional 
claIm through § 1983); and (2) general federal question Junsdiction under § 1331(a) 
(whICh reqUIres $10,000 mlmmum amount m controversy' m 1978, the House of 
Representatives passed bill whICh would have elimmated the $10,000 reqUIrement 
and abolished diversity of citizenshIp Junsdiction. H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1978), 124 CONGo REC. Hl,553-61, Hl,569-70 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978)). 
211. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A COMPILATION OF 
FEDERAL LAws AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS FOR NONDISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS (1978) (staff study). 
212. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. DaVIS, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979) 
(section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, whICh prOVIdes certam protections for 
handicapped persons m federally aSSIsted programs). See generally LIpson, supra 
note 126. 
213. See, e.g., Coalition for Block Grant Compliance HUD, 450 F Supp. 43 
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (action agamst federal and local offiCIals under the Housmg and 
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 94-375, 90 Stat. 633, to enJom 
dispensmg federal funds to community whICh fails to Identify the housmg assIs­
tance needs of persons expected to reSIde withm that community). 
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court. Recent distnct court litigatIon under sectIon 1983 mvolvmg 
police mIsconduct illustrates the potentIal. In Murray v. Mur 
phy 214 the plamtiff brought suit m federal court agamst the City of 
PhiladelphIa, two of its police officers, and theIr supervIsors for 
mIsconduct allegedly vIOlatmg the federal constitutIon, federal cIvil 
nghts statutes, and state tort law In denymg the defendants mo­
tIon to dismISS, the court permitted the plamtiff to mamtam hIs ac 
tIon on all the claims, both constitutIonal and non-constitutIonal. 
Even if the plamtiff ultimately prevails only on the state tort law 
claim, he will be entitled to attorney fees under the 1976 Act. In 
JunsdictIons where the standards for recovery agamst offiCIal mIS­
conduct under state tort law are less restnctIve than under section 
1983, plamtiffs would be well adVIsed to follow the approach of the 
Murray case and other recent suits pursumg that course. 215 
Although not without mIxed blessmgs, litIgatmg these multt­
claIm suits m state court may provIde additIOnal benefits. Take, for 
example, the mcreasmg number of cases m state courts whIch chal­
lenge two areas of traditIOnal state concern: (a) The validity of 
financmg public school education through the property tax system; 
and (b) exclUSIOnary land use regulation by local mumcipalitIes. In 
Robmson v. Cahill,216 the plamtiffs challenged the validity of 
the New Jersey property tax system whICh supported its public 
schools. They asserted claims based on the equal protection clauses 
of the state and federal constitutions as well as prOVlSlons m the 
state constitutIOn relatmg to public education and real property tax 
assessment. In the tnal court, the plamtiffs prevailed on both then 
federal and state constitutional claIms. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court, however, m affirmmg the lower court Judgment, relied 
solely on the state constitutIOn. 217 Similarly m Southern Bur 
lington County NAACP v. TownshIp of Mount Laurel,218 the plam­
tiffs sued to enJom the defendant's zomng ordinance as repugnant 
to the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions 
and the New Jersey zonmg enabling statute. Agam the tnal court 
utilized both state and federal constitutional provlSlons to mvalidate 
the ordinance, but the New Jersey Supreme Court placed its af­
firmance on state law alone. 219 
214. 441 F Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
215. E.g., M.C.I. Concord AdVISory Bd. Hall, 457 F Supp. 911 (D. Mass. 
1978); Santiago City of Philadelphia, 435 F Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
216. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). 
217. Id. at 490-501, 303 A.2d at 282-87. 
218. See note 55 supra. 
219. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725. 
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In both cases, the deCISion of the state supreme court placed 
the Judgments beyond the reVIewmg power of the United States 
Supreme Court, an advantage some public mterest litigants con­
sider critical. 220 At the same time, because of the presence of the 
fourteenth amendment allegations asserted through section 1983, 
the plamtiffs retam the benefit of the 1976 Fees Act, so long as the 
federal constitutional claim meets the test of substantiality and 
both state and federal claims anse out of a "common nucleus of op­
erative fact. "221 
In neither case could the defendant ask the state tnal Judge to 
exercise discretIOn to dismISS the state claims because they sub­
stantially predommate, a power whICh federal Judges may exercise 
under Gibbs when such cases are filed 10 federal court: "Once it 
appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to 
which the federal claim IS only an appendage, the state claim may 
frurly be dismissed. "222 If the Robmson and Mount Laurel cases had 
been filed 10 federal court, the distnct Judge mIght well have exer­
Cised her discretion to dismiSS the state law claIms. 223 The broad 
power exerCIsed by state courts of general JunsdictIon gIVes the 
plamtiff a great advantage to Jom a Wide range of claims, both state 
and federal, whICh even under the liberal rule of the Gibbs-Hagans 
line might not survive a federal court actIOn litigated to Judg­
ment. 224 
220. If the state court Judgment rests on state ground, revIew m the Supreme 
Court IS not available unless the defendant offiCIals are somehow challengmg the va­
lidity of the state law on federal grounds (a very unlikely possibility). Even if the 
state court Judgment rests on both state and federal law, revIew may still be pre­
cluded because of the doctrme of "independent and adequate state ground, e.g., 
Fox Film Corp. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935), unless the state court did not mtend 
to rest its declSlon mdependently on state law. Delaware Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
652 (1979). In contrast, if the same case were mstituted m federal tnal court with 
the state claIms pendent to the federal claIms, the Supreme Court would, of course, 
not be barred by the mdependent and adequate state ground doctnne from re­
vlewmg the entire case. See text accompanymg notes 59-77 supra. E.g., 383 U.S. at 
715. "Commg before the court m thIS way, we are not confined m our revIew of the 
declSlon of the lower [federal] court withm the same limits that we would be if the 
case were here on error from the Judgment of state court. Fallbrook Irrigation 
Dist. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 154 (1896). Indeed, if the federal claIm IS of constitu­
tional dimenSIOns, the Supreme Court has admOnIshed the federal courts to deCIde 
the state claIms first. E.g., Siler v. LOUIsville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). 
221. On occaSIOn, prior deCISIOn of the Supreme Court may undennme the at­
tempt by the plamtiff to satisfy even the mInImal test of substantiality set forth m 
Hagans. 415 U.S. at 528. For example, current litigation challengmg school finance 
systems based on the property tax will have to confront the Impact of San AntOnIO 
School Dist. Rodnguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
222. 383 U.S. at 727. 
223. See, e.g., Moor County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). 
224. ld. See also Schweiker Gordon, 442 F Supp. 1134 (E.D. Pa. 1977); 
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Finally a few state court declSlons have created one disadvan­
tage m wrongful death, CIvil rIghts type actIons brought agamst 
non-federal governmental officIals. In two recent appellate deCI­
SIOns m Califorma225 and Colorado,226 the courts held that con­
stitutIonally-based claIms for relief under sectIon 1983 and under 
state wrongful death statutes merge so as to extmgUIsh the sec­
tIon 1983 claIm. In the Califorma case, thIs merger doctrme pre­
cluded the plamtiff from seCUrIng equitable relief under sectIon 
1983 because the state wrongful death statute provIded only a dam­
age remedy 227 Interestmgly enough, the Califorma court saId that, 
if the case had been filed m federal court, a different result would 
have been reached. 228 In federal court, the appellate tribunal saId 
that the plamtiff could seek both equitable and legal relief under 
sectIOn 1983 and damages under the state wrongful death stat­
ute. 229 ThIS holding would seem to run counter to the well-set­
tled rule that "the law should produce uniform declSlons withm 
each state regardless whether an actIOn IS brought m a state or a 
federal court. "230 While that rule has been black letter law In di­
versity cases SInce Ene Railroad v. Tompkms,231 the Suprem­
acy Clause would make it equally applicable to federal questIon 
suits. 232 
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976 IS a 
broad directIon from the Congress to state and federal courts, al­
lowmg prevailing plamtiffs, among others, to recover theIr counsel 
fees m a WIde range of CIvil rIghts and CIvil libertIes litIgatIon. In 
Jones v. McElroy 429 F Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In each of these cases, the fed­
eral trial Judge dismissed some or all of the pendent state claims. 
225. Alvarez Wiley 71 Cal. App. 3d 599, 604-05, 139 Cal. Rptr. 550, 553-54 
(1977). 
226. Jones Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1, 8, 550 P.2d 339, 344 (1976), cert. dis­
missed, 432 U.S. 183 (1977). 
227 Alvarez Wiley, 71 Cal. App. 3d 599, 605, 139 Cal. Rptr. 550, 553 (1977). 
228. Id., 139 Cal. Rptr. at 553. 
229. Id. 
230. Warner Pernno, 585 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1978); see 330 U.S. at 393; 
cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) ("rules of declSlon act); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (compa­
rable rules of declslOn act for certain Civil nghts cases); Robertson Wegmann, 
436 U.S. 584, 592 (1978) (federal court must ordinarily apply state survival statute In 
§ 1983 action). 
231. Ene R.R. Co. TompkinS, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
232. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Sullivan Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 
U.S. 229, 238 (1969). See also note 230 supra. 
245 1979] MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION 
the context of multI-claIm litIgatIOn whICh mcludes claIms based on 
one or more of the statutes covered by the Act, the Congress has 
recogmzed that modern rules of pleading allow plamtiffs to Jom 
other related claIms whICh are not covered by the Act. A dilemma 
arIses because the court may enter Judgment for the plamtiff on a 
non-fee claIm even though there may be merit to one of the claIms 
covered by the statute. In such cases, if the plamtiff could not re­
cover counsel fees, she mIght well forego Jommg all available 
claIms, thus defeatmg a strong policy for "jomder of claIms, partIes, 
and remedies. "233 
In additIon, the dilemma has an extra dimensIOn when one of 
the plamtiff's claIms rests on a federal constitutIonal ground. In 
such cases, the JudicIally created rule directs the courts to dispose 
of the case, whenever possible, on the non-constitutIOnal claIm, 
whICh may be one not covered by the Fees Act. Recogmzmg these 
problems whICh mhere m many multI-claIm suits, the Congress 
prOVIded a rule of declSlon m the legIslatIve hIstory of the Act. It 
essentIally diVIded the multI-claIm cases mto two categorIes: (1) 
Where only non-constitutIonal claIms are alleged; and (2) where 
both constitutIonal and non-constitutIonal claIms are asserted. For 
the first category it directed the courts to deCIde the fee claIm for 
counsel fee purposes even if the court were mclined to dispose of 
the case on the non-fee ground. In the second category it directed 
the courts to apply the two-pronged test for pendent JUrIsdictIon as 
the baSIS for awarding fees when the plamtiff prevails on the non­
fee claIm. 
The policy reasons undergIrding the congreSSIOnally estab­
lished rule of declSlon for the first category of cases do not appear 
to raIse any partIcular difficultIes. A Judge s dispositIon to resolve 
the plamtiff's lawsuit on the non-fee claIm should not foreclose the 
plamtiff from recoverIng counsel fees. Requmng the court to de­
CIde the claIm covered by the 1976 Fees Act to determme whether 
attorney expenses should be awarded does not Impose substantIal 
additIonal burdens on the court or the partIes. In a few cases, it 
may mean deCIding a questIon of first ImpreSSIOn under the appli­
cable federal statute, or reqUIrmg additIOnal brIefs and argument. 
Those burdens would be present m any event were the plamtiff to 
rest her case solely on the statutory ground covered by the Act. 
The congreSSIOnal rule governmg the second category of cases 
(multI-claIm litIgatIon mvolvmg constitutIonal questIons when the 
233. 383 U.S. at 724 (footnote omitted). 
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dispositIon rests on a non-constitutional ground to whICh the Fees 
Act does not apply) does nllse Important policy Judgments. Why 
should plamtiffs be able to recover theIr counsel fees when they 
prevail on claIms not expressly covered by the 1976 Fees Act? It IS 
mstructIve to examme those reasons bnefly First, the rule en­
hances the "junsprudentlal policy of aVOIding unnecessary deCI­
SIOns of constitutIonal questIons without penalizmg plamtiffs who 
Jom non-constitutIonal claIms. 234 If fees could not be awarded to 
plaIntiffs m such CIrcumstances, they mIght well forego theIr non­
constitutIonal claIms so as to msure recovery of counsel fees. In 
such mstances, the courts would be compelled to deCIde critIcal 
and m some cases far-reachmg questIons of constitutIonal dimen­
SIOn. That unsalutary result would nghtly subject the Congress to 
critIcIsm for lackmg sensitIvity to a JudicIally created rule whICh IS 
suffiCIently sound to merit full congreSSIonal support. 
Second, the consIderatIons of convemence, JudiCIal economy 
and faIrness, whICh moved the Court m Gibbs to mterpret liberally 
the case limitation m artIcle III, are equally applicable here. Be­
cause attorney fees are so hIgh, plamtiffs, and espeCIally theIr attor 
neys, do not lightly engage m litIgatIon unless there IS some prom­
Ise of recovermg counsel fees. If such fees are not available when a 
multI-claIm case mvolvmg a fee-claIm IS deCIded on a non-fee 
ground, the plamtiff mIght forego Jommg non-fee to fee claIms. If 
the plamtiff prevails, that result mIght not be partIcularly detn­
mental. But if they lose on the covered claIm, it mIght lead to the 
filing of a second suit m state court, for example. That tram of 
events would undermme the values of economy convemence, and 
faIrness whIch benefit all partIes, as well as subject the plamtiff un­
necessarily to defenses based on a statute of limitatIons,235 or on 
res Judicata. 236 Those Issues are suffiCIently senous and complex to 
234. Lund Affieck, 442 F Supp. 1109, 1113 (D.R.1. 1977), aff'd, 587 F.2d 75 
(1st Cir. 1978); accord, 588 F.2d at 637 n.5 (dictum). 
235. Cf Owen EqUip. & Erection Co. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 n.20 (1978) 
(state rules of limitation govern plamtiff' subsequent state court suit after unsuc­
cessful attempt to mvoke federal court junsdiction). 
236. E.g., Woods Exploration & Producmg Co. Alummum Co. of Am., 438 
F.2d 1286, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (after judgment m 
related federal suit, the doctnne of res judicata bars subsequent state court action 
(1) whICh alleges state claim ansmg out of the same facts as the litigated federal 
claim; or (2) if the plamtiff was afforded an opportunity to allege the state grounds 
whICh constituted the same cause of action m the federal proceedings under 
Gibbs); accord, International Ass n of Machmlsts & Aerospace Workers Nix, 512 
F.2d 125, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1975) (applymg the pnnclples of Woods Exploration to 
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persuade policymakers to encourage plamtiH's to aVOId those poten­
tIal pitfalls. That IS precIsely the Judgment whICh Congress has 
made here. 
defense based on collateral estoppel). Brady TWA, Inc., 274 A.2d 146 (Del. Super. 
Ct.), afI'd, 282 A.2d 620 (Del. 1971) (state court action based on state claims, whICh 
were or could have been litigated In earlier federal court action under pendent Juns­
diction doctnne, are barred by res Judicata); accord, McCann Whitney 25 
N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1941); see Hughes v. TWA, Inc., 336 A.2d 572, 575-77, (Del. 
Sup. Ct.), cert. denied sub nom. Summa Corp. TWA, Inc., 423 U.S. 841 (1975) 
(after Judgment In related federal suit, the doctrme of res Judicata does not bar 
subsequent state court action whICh alleges state claim ansmg out of the same facts 
as the federal claim (1) where the earlier federal suit was dismissed on Junsdictional 
grounds, not on the merits and (2) where the federal Judge would have dismissed 
the pendent state claim under the discretionary power authonzed m Gibbs); cf· 
Grubb Public Utils. Comm n, 281 U.S. 470, 479 (1930) (action between the same 
parties m federal court barred by pnor state court Judgment regarding matters ac­
tually presented to sustam or defeat the nght asserted, but also as respects any other 
available matter whICh might have been presented to that end"); Note, The 
PreclUSIVe Effect of State Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV 610 (1978). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 61.1, 
at 155, 160-61, 178-79 (Tent. Draft No.5, 1978). But see Atlantic C.L.R. Co. 
Engmeers, 398 U.S. 281, 294-96 (1970) (a plaIntiff has the option of Jommg state 
claim as pendent to federal claim m federal suit under Gibbs or of pursumg the 
state claim m separate action m state court). Although the holding of the Fifth 
Circuit In the Woods Exploration case appears mconslstent with the opmlOn m 
Atlantic C.L.R., the court of appeals never mentioned that aspect of Atlantic 
C.L.R. The Fifth Circuit did examme the Atlantic C.L.R. declSlon for its teach­
mgs on the question whether prevailing party In the completed federal suit 
may secure an mJunction agaInst the subsequent state court proceedings, notwith­
standing the anti-mJunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). The court of appeals 
held that § 2283 authorizes federal court to enJom state court suit whICh IS pre­
cluded under the doctrIne of res Judicata (the so-called relitigation principle). 
438 F.2d at 1312. That holding also appears mconslstent with Atlantic C.L.R. It 
should be noted that the question whether the res Judicata effect IS to be detenmned 
by state or federal law IS another unresolved Issue In thiS complex area of the law 
Compare Southwest AIrlines Co. Texas Int'! AIrlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84 (5th CiL), 
cert. dented, 434 U.S. 832 (1977) (federal law applies) with Hughes TWA, Inc., 
336 A.2d 572 (Del. Sup. Ct.), cert. denied sub nom. Summa Corp. TWA, Inc., 423 
U.S. 841 (1975) (state law applies). Although the Supreme Court has apparently 
never addressed that question when the earlier federal suit Involves "federal ques­
tion JUrIsdiction, it has exammed the Issue m diversity cases. HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 53, at 843-44. If the JUrISdiction of the federal court IS based 
on the citizenship of the parties, the state court need only give that res Judicata ef­
fect to the prior federal Judgment that it would give to comparable Judgment of its 
own courts, even though the effect given IS considered "federal question for pur­
poses of Supreme Court review Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 
(1874). But see Metcalf Watertown, 128 U.S. 585 (1888) (action by an assignee of 
federal court Judgment to enforce that Judgment does not arIse under the Constitu­
tion or laws of the United States to permit mvocation of federal trIal court Junsdic­
tion). Of course, if the federal suit has not yet proceeded to Judgment, none of these 
difficulties arIses because the parties are still free to conduct parallel litigation on 
the same or Similar claims m state court. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 
228 (1922). 
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ThIrd, the Inability of the courts to award fees In these Clr 
cumstances mIght well deter plamtiffs from USIng a federal forum 
to vIndicate federal constitutIonal and statutory nghts. If the Impe­
tus behInd the Gibbs rule itself spnngs m part from a desIre to 
permit plaIntiffs to assert theIr federal nghts In a federal court, 237 
the authonzatIon In the Fees Act may be vIewed as reInforcIng that 
altogether salutary policy While it IS true that state and federal 
courts have concurrent JunsdictIon over federal claIms, the Su­
preme Court has quoted with approval the observatIon of two dis­
tIngUIshed commentators that the federal courts are "the pnmary 
and powerful reliances for vIndicatIng every nght gIven by the 
ConstitutIon, the laws, and treatIes of the United States."238 At a 
mIlllmum, the plamtiff should have a genUIne chOIce whether to 
Ble her complamt m state or federal court, unrestraIned by consId­
eratIons, such as attorney fee awards, that have nothIng to do with 
the merits of the litIgatIon. 
Finally the 1976 Fees Act authonzes an award of counsel fees 
to plamtiffs who prevail" through out-of-court settlements even 
though there has not been a full eVIdentIary heanng on the merits. 
"If the litIgatIon tenlllnates by consent decree, for example, it 
would be proper to award counsel fees. "239 The lower federal 
courts have regularly awarded fees m such clrcumstances. 240 If 
plaIntiffs may recover theIr fees from the courts when no decIsIOn 
IS made on any of theIr claIms because the case IS settled, then it IS 
appropnate to allow fees when Judgment IS entered on one of those 
claIms even if it IS not covered by the Act. The argument In sup­
port of fees m these two types of cases would appear equally 
strong, and that was the congressIonal Judgment. To rule otherwIse 
would encourage defendants to litIgate cases to death, knOWIng 
that, even if they lose, they will not have to pay the plamtiff's at­
torney fees if the ultImate Judgment rests on the non-fee claIm. It 
does little for crowded dockets, m both state and federal courts, to 
encourage unnecessarily extended and protracted litIgatIon. 
237. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 53, at 922-23. 
238. F FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
65 (1928) (quoted In Steffel Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974)) (emphaSIS added 
by Supreme Court). 
239. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 7 See also S. REP supra note 105, at 5, re­
printed tn [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912-13. 
240. E.g., Gagne Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 339-40 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. 
Ct. 44 (1979); King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. 
dented, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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The courts, both state and federal, have generally followed the 
congresslOnal directive, even when they were not fully aware of it. 
There are mstances, however, when the rule has been mIsapplied, 
leading to an erroneous analysIs or result or both. Part of the prob­
lem may be that counsel and courts are not fully aware of the legIs­
lative hIstory and the early JudicIal precedents applymg it. Fur 
thermore, the adoption by Congress of the standards used to 
determme pendent JunsdictIon may have mIsled state and federal 
Judges to apply it to mappropnate cases. Despite these devIations, 
the courts have generally applied it m the expanSIve manner m­
tended by Congress. 
The broad scope of the congresslOnally determmed rule of de­
cislOn IS such that the Fees Act may m fact be available 10 a much 
wIder range of cases than the precedents smce the Act mdicate. 
ThIS IS so for several reasons: (1) The scope of section 1983 whlCh 
extends to federal constitutional and statutory clatms; (2) the avail­
ability of state as well as federal courts for mstitutmg multI-clrum 
litigation mvolvmg federal and state questions; (3) the expansIve 
nature of the pendent JunsdictlOn doctnne; and (4) the liberal Jom­
der rules extant m most Amencan JunsdictIons. These factors, sm­
gularly or m combmatIon, will provIde the baSIS for applymg the 
1976 Fees Awards Act m an ever-widenmg CIrcle of litigation, es­
pecIally m those lawsuits where the defendants are persons actmg 
under color of state law It IS not Improbable to suggest that with 
a little bit of creative thmkmg, many (and maybe most) suits 
mvolvmg state action will be covered by the Fees Act. In thIS 
sense, as one knowledgeable observer noted, the statute can have 
as dramatic an Impact upon the establishment and enforcement of 
basIc CIvil and constitutional nghts m thIS country as any CIvil 
nghts legIslation smce Reconstruction. "241 It IS not necessary to 
stretch the Act and its legIslative hIstory beyond theIr natural 
Import to conclude that such an expanSIve use IS well withm the 
parameters set by the Congress. 
241. Derfner, supra note 4, at 441. 
